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California Supreme Court Survey
May 1995 - August 1996
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either an article or
summary format. Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of cases in a concise for-
mat.
ARTICLES
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The California Airport and Maritime Plant Quarantine,
Inspection, and Plant Protection Act, which authorizes
the levy of inspection fees on imported foreign agricul-
tural goods, is unconstitutional because it discriminates
unjustifiably in violation of the Commerce Clause:
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Voss ............ 732
II. CONTRACTS
A tort cause of action for bad faith denial of a contract's
existence does not lie in a noninsurance contract breach:
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co ............ 738
Ill. CImNAL LAW
A. The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte
on any lesser included offense supported by the evidence,
regardless of the arguments of the prosecution and de-
fense:
People v. Barton ................................ 744
B. The sufficiency of an uncorroborated, out-of-court identi-
fication to support a conviction should be measured by
the substantial evidence test:
People v. Cuevas ............................... 749
C. The required mental state for conspiracy to commit mur-
der is intent to kill, and a court commits reversible error
by instructing a jury on theories of implied malice:
People v. Swain ................................. 757
IV. EMPLOYER & EMPLOYEE
An employer's course of conduct and representations
may create an enforceable, implied-in-fact contract pro-
hibiting the employer from demoting an employee with-
out cause:
Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co ................. 766
V. EMPLOYER LBLmTY
A. An employee who sexually harasses co-workers will not
be able to seek indemnity from the employer when the
conduct is not a risk that may fairly be regarded as typi-
cal of or broadly incidental to the operation of the
employer's enterprise:
Farmers Insurance Group v. County of
Santa Clara .................................... 772
B. A hospital will not be vicariously liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior for an employee's sexual
assault of a patient when the assault was not engendered
by the employment:
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial
H ospital . ..................................... 784
VI. IMMUNITY
When a government employee driving a motor vehicle
negligently, injures or kills a person while acting within
the scope of his employment, California Government
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Code section 845.8 does not protect public entities from
the liabilities imposed by Vehicle Code section 17001:
Thomas v. City of Richmond ...................... 792
VII. INSURANCE
Insurance policies obtained by highway carriers pursu-
ant to state regulations remain in effect until the Public
Utilities Commission receives notice of cancellation;
however, insurance companies are entitled to reimburse-
ment for certain payments made pursuant to the regula-
tions administered by the Public Utilities Commission:
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Tab
Transportation, Inc ............................. 799
VIII. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section
340.6(a)(1), the determination of when a plaintiff has
suffered "actual injury" for the purpose of commencing
the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice cause of
action is generally a question of fact, unless the facts are
undisputed wherein the determination is a matter of
law:
Adams v. Paul ............................... 806
IX. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Landlords and hotel proprietors may not be held strictly
liable for injuries to their tenants or guests caused by de-
fects in the premises:
Peterson v. Superior Court ..................... 812
SUMMARIES
I. Community Property
When an employee spouse continues to work after
the date upon which retirement benefits become due
and the nonemployee spouse chooses immediate pay-
ment of their share of the benefits, the nonemployee
spouse is entitled to obtain payments from the date
on which he or she files a motion seeking immediate
payment.
In re Marriage of Carlos, Supreme Court of California,
decided May 30, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 381, 916 P.2d 476, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 ................................. 816
II. Criminal Law
A. Statute authorizing serious felony enhancement for
prior conviction of burglary of "inhabited dwelling
house" encompassed burglary of inhabited vessel at
time of enactment of statute.
People v. Cruz, Supreme Court of California, decided
August 5, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 764, 919 P.2d 731, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 117. ................................ 817
B. Because the defendant's initial display of a firearm
contributed to the completion of an essential ele-
ment of subsequent sex crimes, the defendant used
the firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.3(a), which provides for sentence enhance-
ments when the person uses a firearm or other dead-
ly weapon in the commission of the crime.
People v. Masbruch, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed August 26, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1001, 920 P.2d 705, 55
Cal. Rptr. 2d 760 ................................ 818
[Vol. 24: 725, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
C. California Penal Code section 969a allows the prose-
cution to amend a "pending indictment or informa-
tion" to allege prior convictions after the defendant
has been convicted but before he has been sen-
tenced.
People v. Valladoli, Supreme Court of California, decided
July 18, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 590, 918 P.2d 999, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 695 ................................. 819
III. Eminent Domain
Under the Eminent Domain Law of California, a pro-
vision of a lease which provides for termination in
the event of acquisition for public use does not pre-
vent the lessee from receiving compensation for the
taking of his leasehold or other property.
Vista v. Fielder, Supreme Court of California, decided
July 25, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 612, 919 P.2d 151, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 861 ................................. 819
IV. Hearsay
When proving convictions of "prior serious felonies,"
excerpts from a preliminary hearing transcript are
admissible under the former testimony hearsay ex-
ception because although the witnesses may be actu-
ally available to testify, they are "unavailable" under
controlling case law; however, statements from a
probation report that fail to fit under any hearsay
exception are inadmissible.
People v. Reed, Supreme Court of California, decided
April 25, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 217, 914 P.2d 184, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 106. ................................ 821
V. Lotteries
The California State Lottery may not operate the
game Keno because it does not meet the statutory
definition of a "lottery game" or that of a "lottery"
in accordance with the California State Lottery Act.
Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, Supreme
Court of California, decided June 24, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th
475, 917 P.2d 651, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812. ............ 822
VI. Public Aid and Welfare
A. California Welfare and Institutions Code section
14170(a)(1) requires the Department of Health Ser-
vices to challenge the truth or accuracy of providers'
cost reports within three years, but does not estab-
lish a time limitation governing the final determina-
tion of the reimbursement amount due providers.
Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center v. Beishe, Supreme
Court of California, decided August 1, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th
748, 919 P.2d 721, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107. ............ 823
B. Under rule 1466(b) of the California Rules of Court,
a juvenile court judge is not limited to making a de-
termination of a change of circumstances only if a
"sua sponte" condition exists. Additionally, a juve-
nile court judge is not barred from making a determi-
nation of a change of circumstances if a party makes
a request to the court without filing a petition for
modification on the ground of changed circumstanc-
es.
San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Supe-
rior Court, Supreme Court of California, decided August
8, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 882, 919 P.2d 1329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
396 ....................................... 824
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VII. Schools
California Education Code, section 44929.21(b), pro-
viding the reelection procedures for probationary
teachers which a school district must follow, pre-
empts any conflicting procedural protections to be
set forth in a collective bargaining agreement.
Board of Education of the Round Valley Unified School
District v. Round Valley Teachers Ass'n, Supreme Court
of California, decided April 29, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 269,
914 P.2d 193, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 .................. 825
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The California Airport and Maritime Plant Quarantine,
Inspection, and Plant Protection Act, which authorizes
the levy of inspection fees on imported foreign agricul-
tural goods, is unconstitutional because it discriminates
unjustifiably in violation of the Commerce Clause:
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Voss.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Voss,' the California Supreme
Court addressed whether the California Airport and Maritime Plant Quar-
antine, Inspection, and Plant Protection Act 2 (Act) violated the federal
Commerce Clause.3 The Act required vessels carrying agricultural goods
from foreign countries to pay an inspection fee upon entering California,
but allowed the inspection fees for domestic goods entering California to
be paid out of the state's general operating fund.4 The Supreme Court of
1. 12 Cal. 4th 503, 907 P.2d 430, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1851
(1995). Justice Mosk wrote the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas, and
Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 503-32, 907 P.2d
430-47, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582-99.
2. CAL. FOOD & AGmc. CODE §§ 5350-5353 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
3. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides: "Congress shall
have Power ... (T]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
4. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 508, 907 P.2d at 432, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.
Congress authorized the USDA to implement an expansive inspection program of ship-
ments entering the United States. Id. at 508-09, 907 P.2d at 432, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
584. Nevertheless, in 1990 California passed the Act in an effort to protect its $19.9
billion agricultural industry from pests, including the Mediterranean fruit fly. Id. at 509,
512, 907 P.2d at 432, 434, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584, 586. The Act required the California
Department of Food and Agriculture (the Department) to compile a "list of countries
which [it] has reason to believe are potential sources of ... pests" and to establish an
inspection program at California's airports and marine facilities for goods that either
originated in or stopped at a country on the list Id. at 511, 907 P.2d at 433, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 585; see CAL FOOD & AGmc. CODE § 5352 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (di-
recting the Department to compile a list of countries that are potential sources of
pests); id. § 5350 (mandating the imposition of the inspection fee scheme); id. § 5353
(delineating the amount of the fees to be collected). The Act authorized the Depart-
ment to fund the program through imposition of inspection fees on carriers of such
foreign goods. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 509-11, 907 P.2d at 432-33, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 584-85; see CAL FOOD & AGRiC. CODE § 5351 (authorizing the levy of inspection
fees on air carriers); id. § 5352 (authorizing the levy of fee on marine carriers).
Through this program, the Department paid for an increased number of federally-con-
ducted inspections, though the types of inspections conducted by the USDA did not
change. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 510, 907 P.2d at 432-33, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
584-85. To ensure conformity with California's agricultural quarantines, goods crossing
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California, reversing the court of appeal, held that the Act was facially
discriminatory because the sole determinant for disparate treatment
under the inspection fee scheme was a shipment's place of origin.' Un-
der the strict scrutiny standard,8 the Act's discrimination could not be
justified.' Therefore, the court held that the Act violated the Commerce
Clause.'
II. TREATMENT
After reviewing the history of the Act,9 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia examined the constitutional limitations imposed upon a state's au-
thority to enact legislation affecting federally protected commerce.' ° The
court observed that although the Commerce Clause omits specific refer-
ence to state legislatures," courts nevertheless have consistently held
that the Commerce Clause tacitly declares that a state may not unjus-
tifiably discriminate against a protected form of commerce. 2 This "neg-
California's land borders are inspected at state-rm sites at no cost to the carrier (ex-
cluding the border with Mexico, where the USDA conducts inspections). Id. at 510 &
n.2, 907 P.2d at 433 & n.2, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585 & n.2. These inspections of domes-
tic ground shipments are paid for out of the general operating fund of the state. Id. at
512, 907 P.2d at 434, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
5. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 527, 907 P.2d at 443, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595;
see infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text
6. While the validity of federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause is
subject to "rational basis" review, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995),
state statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce, i.e., statutes that violate
the "dormant" Commerce Clause, receive "strict scrutiny" review. Associated Indus. v.
Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 1820 (1994).
7. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 532, 907 P.2d at 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599;
see infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
8. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 532, 907 P.2d at 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
9. Id. at 508-13, 907 P.2d at 432-35, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584-87; see supra note 4
(providing an overview of relevant provisions).
10. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 514, 907 P.2d at 435, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587.
11. See supra note 3 (reciting relevant text of the Commerce Clause). See generally
13 CAL JuR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 214-217 (1989) (discussing the commerce power
under federalism).
12. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 907 P.2d at 435-36, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
587-88; see, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994) (rec-
ognizing that the Commerce Clause "has long been understood ... to provide protec-
tion from state legislation inimical to the national commerce even where Congress has
not acted") (internal quotations omitted); Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994) ("The Commerce Clause [has] a 'negative' aspect
that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against [interstate com-
ative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause is inferred from the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution " and has been repeatedly and recently reaf-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court. 4
The first of two prongs of the court's analysis under the negative Com-
merce Clause was whether the Act regulates "evenhandedly"-i.e., wheth-
er the Act is discriminatory under the Commerce Clause." A statute
that treats differently in-state (or domestic) economic interests and out-
of-state (or foreign) economic interests is discriminatory under Com-
merce]."). See generally 15A AM. Jun. 2D Commerce § 95 (1976 and Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing discriminatory state legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause); 8 B.E.
WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 1090 (1988 & Supp. 1995)
(citing cases interpreting discriminatory state legislation under the Commerce Clause);
13 CAL JuR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 220-222 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (discussing state
legislation under the Commerce Clause); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN L REV. 703, 705 (1975) (advocating that courts can properly
determine the constitutionality of legislation using values implied in the constitution);
Zain E. Hussain, Comment, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California:
Does the Application of Worldwide Unitary Taxation to Non-U.S. Parent Corporate
Groups Violate the Commerce Clause?, 18 FORDRAM INT'L UJ. 1475, 1487-97 (1995)
(discussing the dormant Commerce Clause in the context of international commerce
and taxation).
13. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 907 P.2d at 435-36, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
587-88; Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 & n.9; see THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James
Madison) (advocating federal congressional power over commerce to prevent coastal
states from excessively profiting from local import taxes at the expense of other
states). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L REv. 395, 433 (1989) (arguing that the pur-
pose of the Commerce Clause was to promote national unity); Michael E. Smith, State
Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL L REv. 1203, 1207-08 (1986)
(discussing the Framers' intent behind the Commerce Clause); Eric W. Hagen, Note,
United States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L
REv. 1361, 1363-64 (1996) (-[T]he original purpose of the Commerce Clause was not so
much a grant to Congress of a general police power, but rather a means of eliminating
trade barriers among the states.").
14. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 907 P.2d at 435, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587.
See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092-1287 (1986) (ana-
lyzing Supreme Court cases interpreting the negative Commerce Clause).
15. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 516-17, 907 P.2d at 437, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589.
This prong of a court's inquiry affects the resolution of the case dramatically because
a state statute that regulates evenhandedly with "only incidental effects on [protected]
commerce (is] valid unless 'the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.'" Id, at 517, 907 P.2d at 437, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 589 (quoting Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1350). See generally 8 B.E. WInaN, SUMMA-
RY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 1092 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
state legislation that is unduly burdensome under the Commerce Clause). However, a
state statute that discriminates against interstate commerce is strictly scrutinized by the
court and is "virtually per se invalid." Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 517, 907 P.2d at
437, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589 (quoting Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1350).
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merce Clause analysis, regardless of the state's interest in creating the
statute." In the instant case, because the sole determinant for assessing
an inspection fee was the shipment's country of origin, 17 the supreme
court found the Act to be facially discriminatory."
In finding the Act to be facially discriminatory, the court rejected the
reasoning adopted by the court of appeal. 9 The supreme court held that
the very administrative and financial segregation upon which the court of
appeal had erroneously relied in finding the inspections too dissimilar to
be compared under the Commerce Clause was the heart of the discrimi-
nation in the regulatory scheme." Moreover, in contrast to the court of
appeal, the California Supreme Court refused to require that the bur-
dened carriers demonstrate sufficient similarity to unburdened carriers
before the court would find the Act discriminatory.2' The court ob-
served that substantial similarity has no bearing on whether a statute is
facially discriminatory.' Regardless, the court concluded that applying
the substantially similar requirement would not alter its determination
that the Act was facially discriminatory.'
The court next turned to the second prong of its analysis: whether the
discrimination under the Act could be justified.24 The court reiterated
that a state statute that discriminates against a federally protected class
16. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 517, 907 P.2d at 437, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589;
Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1350 ("[T]he purpose of, or justification for, a law has no
bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory.").
17. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 520-21, 907 P.2d at 439-40, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
591-92; see supra note 4.
18. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 527, 907 P,2d at 443, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
19. Id. at 520-27, 907 P.2d at 439-43, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591-95.
20. Id. at 522, 907 P.2d at 440, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. Nor could the state properly
rely on administrative convenience to justify the disparate treatment. Id. at 522 n.11,
907 P.2d at 440 n.11, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592 n.11.
21. Id. at 523, 907 P.2d at 440-41, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592-93. The court observed
that the United States Supreme Court had applied this "similarly situated" requirement
only when discussing whether a state tax on foreign or domestic interstate commerce
was justified. Id. at 522, 907 P.2d at 441, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. In the context of a
compensatory tax, substantial similarity is but one logical element of the justification
prong of the court's analysis. Id. at 523, 907 P.2d at 441, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. Such
compensatory taxes simply "make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by
intrastate commerce." Id.
22. Id. at 523, 907 P.2d at 441, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
23. Id. at 525, 907 P.2d at 442-43, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594-95. The court emphasized
that only differences of degree, not differences in kind or purpose, existed between the
inspections of foreign produce compared with those of domestic produce. Id.
24. Id. at 527, 907 P.2d at 443, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
will pass constitutional muster only if it "advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminato-
ry alternatives."25 Under this "strictest scrutiny" standard, statutes found
to discriminate under the Commerce Clause are "'typically struck down
without further inquiry.' 26 Applying this standard of review, the court
conceded that preservation of California's agricultural industry was a
legitimate local interest advanced by the state when enacting the Act.2
Additionally, the. court observed that a class of commerce subject to a
regulation may be required to pay for the regulation's implementation,
provided the regulation is applied evenhandedly.2 Thus, under the
court's analysis, California could require carriers of foreign produce to
pay for their fair share of the inspection costs, including a higher fee if
inspections of foreign commerce carriers are more expensive than those
of domestic goods carriers.' However, under the Act, only one class of
carriers, those importing foreign commerce, paid any inspection fee.' In
contrast, the state completely subsidized the inspections of domestic
commerce carriers.31 Therefore, the disparate treatment under the Act
could be justified neither as resulting from the difference in the admin-
istration costs of the inspections nor as a compensatory tax.32
Finally, the court declred that there was no triable issue of fact as to
whether the state's scheme was the least restrictive means to accomplish
its legitimate purpose.3 The court held that under the strict scrutiny
standard, either of two proposed alternatives-removing the inspection
fees from foreign commerce carriers or imposing a similar fee on domes-
tic goods carriers-would constitute a reasonable and less discriminatory
means of achieving the legitimate state objective.' Thus, because the
25. Id. at 527, 907 P.2d at 444, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys.
v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994)).
26. Id. (quoting Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 1820 (1994)). For two
rare exceptions where states successfully defended statutes that discriminated against
interstate commerce, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-52 (1986) (holding that the
threat to local fisheries justified a facially discriminatory statute banning the importa-
tion of out-of-state baitfish), and Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (holding that
risk of disease affecting beef justified a discriminatory state statute requiring local
inspections of imported meat).
27. Pacific Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 527, 907 P.2d at 444, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 528, 907 P.2d at 444, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
31. Id. at 529, 907 P.2d at 444, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
32. Id. at 529, 907 P.2d at 445, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 529-30, 907 P.2d at 445-46, 48 'Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98.
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Act's discrimination could not be justified, the court concluded that the
inspection fee scheme violated the Commerce Clause.'
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Pacific Merchant presents what is perhaps an unusual fact pattern in
recent Commerce Clause cases in that California's inspection scheme did
not benefit its own economy at the expense of its sister states; rather, it
burdened foreign commerce while benefiting domestic trade.' Still, an
undivided California Supreme Court correctly observed that such a case
exemplifies the very problems the Framers sought to avoid when they in-
serted the Commerce Clause into the United States Constitution." Fol-
lowing black-letter rules of Commerce Clause analysis, the court held
that the California Airport and Maritime Plant Quarantine, Inspection,
and Plant Protection Act was facially discriminatory and subject to the
strictest judicial scrutiny because the Act required importers of foreign
produce to pay an inspection fee upon entering California, while the
state paid for the inspections of similar domestic shipments.' Under
this standard of review, the disparate treatment under the inspection
scheme could not be justified.' Therefore, the court concluded that the
Act was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.' Thus,
Pacific Merchant returns to the political process the issue of how to
properly fund an adequate agricultural and animal inspection program.
Pacific Merchant presents to the legislature the option of either accept-
ing the federally-funded USDA inspections of imported produce as ade-
quate protections for California's agricultural industry, or enacting fur-
ther legislation that conforms with constitutional standards.
KIRK ALAN WALTON
35. Id. at 532, 907 P.2d at 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
36. Id. at 518, 907 P.2d at 438, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
37. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
40. Pacifi Merchant, 12 Cal. 4th at 532, 907 P.2d at 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
II. CONTRACTS
A tort cause of action for bad faith denial of a contract's
existence does not lie in a noninsurance contract breach:
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.,1 the California Supreme
court considered whether a tort cause of action exists for a party's bad
faith denial of the existence of a contract.2 The trial court entered judg-
ment for Freeman & Mills, indicating that the accounting finn should
recover in tort for Belcher Oil's bad faith denial of the existence of the
contract.3 The court of appeal reversed, "finding no special relationship
between the parties to justify" a recovery in tort.4 The California Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeal, overruled Seaman's,5 and
1. 11 Cal. 4th 85, 900 P.2d 669, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Baxter, Klein, and Werdegar concurred.
Id. at 87-103, 900 P.2d at 670-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421-31. Justice Kennard wrote a
concurring opinion in which Justice Arabian joined. Id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard J., concurring). Justice Mosk concurred in part and dissented
in part. Id. at 104-17, 900 P.2d at 680-89, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431-40 (Mosk J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 87-88, 900 P.2d at 670, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. In June of 1987, Belcher
Oil retained the law firm of Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius (Morgan) to defend itself
against a lawsuit Id. at 88, 900 P.2d at 670, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. As part of the
retainer, Belcher Oil agreed to pay for the costs of the suit, including any accounting
fees. Id. Belcher Oil's general counsel, William Dunker, expressly authorized the ac-
counting firm of Freeman & Mills, Inc. to provide accounting services related to the
pending litigation. Id. In April of 1988, Neil Bowman, who replaced Dunker as general
counsel for Belcher Oil, discharged Morgan. Id. Bowman requested a summary of the
work that Freeman & Mills prepared and informed them that their services would no
longer be necessary. Id. Freeman & Mills final summary included a bill for $77,538.13
for services rendered. Id. For approximately one year, Freeman & Mills sent monthly
statements to Belcher Oil indicating an outstanding balance. Id. at 89, 900 P.2d at 670,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. In September of 1989, Bowman finally refused to pay, stating
that Belcher Oil had never been advised of the extent of the accounting firm's servic-
es. Id. Freeman & Mills filed a cause of action for breach of contract and an action in
tort for bad faith denial of the contract. Id. at 89, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
422. For a discussion of when a breach of contract is also a tort, see 1 B.E. WrrIUN,
SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAw, Contracts § 821 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995).
3. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 89, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
4. Id. at 90, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
5. The court of appeal relied on Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984), overruled by, Free-
man, 11 Cal. 4th 85, 900 P.2d 669, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (1995), to evaluate when tort
recovery is available where there is a bad faith denial of a contractual relationship.
Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 90, 900 P.2d at 671, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
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found that a tort recovery for bad faith denial of the existence of a con-
tractual relationship did not apply.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by calling into question the validity of the
holding in Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,'
which recognized the existence of a tort for bad faith denial of contract.8
The court reviewed its decisions rendered prior to Seaman's and found
that the cases were uniform in suggesting that tort recovery in breach of
contract cases is unavailable in noninsurance related agreements.9 The
court found further support to overrule Seaman's by assessing the lower
courts' application of the tort recovery rule."° The court recognized that
6. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 90, 103, 900 P.2d at 671, 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422,
431. For a discussion of Seaman's, see Jill Pride Anderson, Comment, Lender Liability
for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 EMORY UJ. 917, 958-60
(1987).
7. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354. In Seaman's, the
California Supreme Court held that "a party to a contract may incur tort remedies
when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by
denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id. at 769,
686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
8. Freenan, 11 Cal. 4th at 90-92, 900 P.2d at 671-73, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422-24.
9. Id. at 93-95, 900 P.2d at 674-75, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425-26. Courts "should limit
tort recovery in contract breach situations to the insurance area, at least in the ab-
sence of violation of an independent duty arising from principles of tort law other than
the denial of the existence of, or liability under, the breached contract." Id. at 95, 900
P.2d at 675, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426. In coming to this conclusion, the court examined
several of its opinions. Id. at 93-95, 900 P.2d at 674-75, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425-26; see
Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 869 P.2d 454, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 475 (1994) (holding that tort recovery is not available when a contracting
party arranges to breach the contract); Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864
P.2d 88, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993) (precluding tort recovery for employer misrepresen-
tations related to the termination of employment contracts); Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (declining to extend tort
recovery in the context of employment contracts).
10. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 95-98, 900 P.2d at 675-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426-28. See
generally Dana Rae Landsdorf, Comment, California's Detortification of Contract Law:
Is the Seaman's Tort Dead?, 26 Loy. LA. L REV. 213, 222-31 (1992) (discussing
California's trend toward limiting Seaman's).
lower courts constantly encountered difficulty in applying the Seaman's
decision and frequently interpreted it inconsistently. 1
The court also considered policy reasons that favor the exclusion of
tort remedies for noninsurance breach of contract cases.12 For example,
allowing tort recovery for breach of contract could increase the load on
an already overburdened judicial system. 3 The court reasoned that
courts would be flooded if every party denying a contractual breach
were subjected to tort actions for merely defending a lawsuit. 4 In as-
sessing the traditional goals of contract remedies, the court found that,
unlike tort remedies, contract remedies encourage "efficient breaches."
The court explained that the notion of efficient breaches allows for the
"increased production of goods and services at lower cost to society."6
The court also espoused its preference for allowing the legislature to
define the applicable remedies in contract cases. 7
The court concluded that the holding in Seaman's, allowing tort re-
covery for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract, should be over-
ruled." The court favored a general rule precluding tort recovery for
noninsurance contract breach in cases where no other duty arising from
tort principles has been violated." Since the court found that no tort
action was available for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract,
the court thereby affirmed the court of appeal and held that Freeman &
Mills could not recover under a tort cause of action.20
11. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 95-98, 900 P.2d at 675-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426-28.
12. Id. at 97-98, 900 P.2d at 676-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28.
13. Id. at 97, 900 P.2d at 676, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427.
14. Id. Seaman's offered no guidelines to help attorneys determine whether they
were defending against a suit or committing a tort. See James H. Cook, Comment,
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortiouts Breach of the Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case,
71 IowA L REV. 893, 897-98 (1986) (discussing the problems created by such a lack of
specificity).
15. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 97-98, 900 P.2d at 676-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28. See
generally Stephen S. Ashley, BAD FArrH AcTiONS §§ 11:05-:10 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (ana-
lyzing the theory of efficient contract breach); C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen,
Commercial Bad Faith" Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for "Stone-
walling," 21 U.S.F. L REv. 419, 429-32 (1987) (differentiating between contract and tort
remedies).
16. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 98, 900 P.2d at 676-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28.
17. Id. at 98, 900 P.2d at 677, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428 (citing Harris v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 70, 80-82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 656-57 (1993)).
18. Id. at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
19. Id. at 102, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31.
20. Id. at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
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B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority, but took issue with the
majority's discussion of Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.21 Justice Kennard stat-
ed that a discussion of Hunter was unnecessary since the facts of Hunt-
er encompassed a violation of an independent duty arising out of tort
principles, facts which were not present in the case at bar.'
C. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In Justice Mosk's separate opinion, he concurred in the majority's
judgment, but disagreed with the majority's holding that Seaman's was
incorrectly decided.' Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's holding
that a breach of contract is made tortious when an independent duty
arising from tort principles is breached.24 Justice Mosk identified two
broad categories of cases where tortious conduct in a contractual setting
should also lead to tort recovery.25 The first category of cases involves
the use of tortious means by one contracting party to coerce the other
party into foregoing contractual rights.26 The second category involves
an intentional breach of contract where the breaching party intentionally
and knowingly causes severe injury to the other party.27
In assessing the holding of Seaman's, Justice Mosk indicated that tor-
tious recovery was properly permitted in that instance since it fell into
the second category, allowing tort recovery for an intentional breach of
contract where the breaching party knew that the other party would
suffer severe consequential damages.' Since Justice Mosk believed that
21. Id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard, J., concurring);
Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864 P.2d 88, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993) (pre-
cluding tort recovery for employer misrepresentations affecting an employment con-
tract).
22. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 104, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
23. Id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 680-81, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431-32 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
24. Id. at 104, 900 P.2d at 681, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
25. Id. at 109-10, 900 P.2d at 684, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
26. Id. at 110-11, 900 P.2d at 684-86, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435-37 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
27. Id. at 111-12, 900 P.2d at 686, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
28. Id. at 115-16, 900 P.2d at 688-89, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439-40 (Mosk, J., concurring
the case at bar did not fall into either category, however, he concurred
with the majority and stated that tort recovery was not available.'
Ill. IMPACT
Although the court held that tort recovery was impermissible for a
breach of contract absent some other violation of a duty arising out of
tort principles, the court emphasized that this holding should not inter-
fere with existing precedent allowing tort recovery in insurance cases.
30
Indeed, the unique characteristics of insurance contracts, including the
fiduciary relationship between the insurance company and the insured,
the public service aspects of insurance, and the adhesive nature of most
insurance agreements, compel the imposition of tort liability.3' In terms
of the duty owed to insurance carriers, the court's ruling does not affect
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and it should not be extended to
deny an insured the right to recover in tort for a breach of contract. 2
In addressing the reaches of its holding, the court noted that the legis-
lature should be responsible for drafting additional remedies for
noninsurance breach of contract cases.3 The court suggested that such
and dissenting).
29. Id. at 117, 900 P.2d at 689, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
30. Id. at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
31. Id. at 109, 900 P.2d at 684, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169
Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (holding that an insurance company's failure to investigate a pol-
icy may constitute a tortious breach of contract)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980);
see also Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)
(holding that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by an insurance
company may give rise to a recovery in tort). See generally Sandra Chutorian, Com-
ment, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86
COLuM. L REv. 377, 382-84 (1986) (analyzing the development of the tortious breach of
contract in the insurance context).
32. See Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
33. Id. "[N]othing we say here would prevent the Legislature from creating addition-
al civil remedies for noninsurance contract breach, including such measures as provid-
ing litigation costs and attorney fees in certain aggravated cases, or assessing increased
compensatory damages covering lost profits and other losses attributable to the
breach." Id. See generally John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, CONTRACTS § 14-3 (3d
ed. 1987) (discussing punitive damages in contract actions); Putz & Klippen, supra note
14 (arguing for the expansion of awarding attorney's fees in breach of contract cases);
John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Con-
tract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Pull Compensation, 33 UCLA L REv. 1565
(1986) (discussing available and proposed remedies for breach of contract).
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enactments could include allowing attorney's fees or increasing the com-
pensatory damages to include other losses attributable to the breach.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Freeman, uncertainty existed as to whether tort remedies
were available in breach of contract cases.35 This uncertainty stemmed
from the court's ruling in Seaman's, which allowed for a tort remedy in
a noninsurance breach of contract case, but did not clarify the extent of
such an action.' By overruling Seaman's, the California Supreme Court
limited the scope of tort recovery in breach of contract cases to two
scenarios: (1) breach of contract insurance cases, and (2) where a party
breaches a duty grounded in tort principles.37
ROLAND T. KELLY
34. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 103, 900 P.2d at 680, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
35. Id. at 95-97, 900 P.2d at 675-76, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426-27.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 102, 900 P.2d at 679-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31.
IHI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua
sponte on any lesser included offense supported by
the evidence, regardless of the arguments of the
prosecution and defense: People v. Barton.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Barton,' the California Supreme Court considered wheth-
er a defendant can prevent the trial court from instructing the jury on a
lesser offense included within the crime charged.2 The supreme court af-
firmed the judgment of the court of appeal, holding that the jury should
be instructed on any lesser included offense supported by the evidence
regardless of a party's opposition or an inconsistent defense theory.' The
1. 12 Cal. 4th 186, 906 P.2d 531, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569 (1995). Justice Kennard deliv-
ered the unanimous opinion of the court. Id. at 190-204, 906 P.2d at 53241, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 570-79.
2. Id. at 190, 906 P.2d at 532, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570. Marco Sanchez encountered
Andrea Barton while driving in Pacific Beach on the morning of February 22, 1990. Id.
at 191, 906 P.2d at 532, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570. Sanchez honked his horn when Ms.
Barton's car stalled in the intersection, and she replied with a rude gesture. Id.
Sanchez swerved into Ms. Barton's lane, forced her to the side of the road, and spat
on her vehicle's closed passenger window. Id. Ms. Barton, upset by the incident, con-
tacted her father, Howard Barton. Id. Mr. Barton, who was carrying a gun, accompa-
nied his daughter to look for Sanchez's car, which they found in a parking lot at a
nearby shopping center. Id. at 191, 906 P.2d at 533, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. Mr.
Barton found Sanchez in a store and they argued. Id. Eventually Sanchez tried to leave
the shopping center in his car. Id. Mr. Barton approached Sanchez's car, drew his
gun, and told Sanchez to get out of the car. Id. at 191-92, 906 P.2d at 533, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 571. Mr. Barton then shot and killed Sanchez. Id. at 192, 906 P.2d at 533,
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. At trial, the defendant contended that Sanchez grabbed for a
knife and that the gun accidentally fired. Id. at 192-93, 906 P.2d at 533-34, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 571-72. Experts conflicted as to the likelihood of the gun accidentally dis-
charging. Id. at 193, 906 P.2d at 534, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572. The defense requested
the court not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense in-
cluded within the crime of murder. Id. The trial court denied the request, and the jury
convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 193-94, 906 P.2d at 534, 47
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572. The defendant appealed his conviction and argued that the evi-
dence failed to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and that his objection
should have prevented the trial court from giving the instruction. Id. at 194, 906 P.2d
at 534, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572. The court of appeal disagreed and affirmed the
defendant's conviction. Id. The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve the
confusion regarding a trial court's broad duty to instruct on lesser included offenses
and its more limited duty to instruct on possible defenses. Id. at 194, 906 P.2d at 534-
35, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572-73.
3. Id, at 204, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. See generally 21 CAL JuR.
3D Criminal Law § 3049 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (outlining a court's duty to give in-
structions sua sponte).
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court also held that a trial court has a more limited duty to instruct sua
sponte on a particular defense, but should not instruct on a defense that
is either inconsistent with the defendant's theory at trial or is opposed
by the defense.4
II. TREATMENT
Justice Kennard, writing for a unanimous court, began the opinion by
reviewing the case of People v. Sedeno.5 In Sedeno, the California Su-
preme Court held that when the evidence is sufficient to establish a less-
er included offense, a trial court must instruct the jury on that offense.6
The Sedeno court also held that a trial court has a limited duty to give
the jury instructions on possible defenses when the defendant appears to
rely on such a defense or when the defense seems consistent with the
defense theory.7
In Barton, the defendant asked the court to overrule Sedeno and hold
that a trial court's duty to instruct the jury is the same for both lesser
included offenses and defenses.' The supreme court disagreed with the
defendant, and stated that a trial court has a broad duty to instruct on
lesser included offenses because the jury must be aware of all its options
in order to make a fair decision.9 However, the court reasoned that the
duty to instruct the jury on particular defenses is more limited because
an instruction inconsistent with the defense's theory of the case could
4. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 197, 906 P.2d at 536, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574.
5. 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
6. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 194-95, 906 P.2d at 535, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (citing
People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 715, 518 P.2d 913, 921, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1974)).
See generally 5 B.E. WrIN & NORMAN L EPsTEIN, CAUIXORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial
§ 2936 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (summarizing the requirements of instructing on
lesser included offenses); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3067 (1985 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing the defendant's right to instructions on lesser included offenses); Christen
R Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 AM.
CRIM. L REV. 445 (1984) (discussing the constitutional concerns for jury instructions on
lesser included offenses); Janis L Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the
Lesser Included Offense, 50 BROOL L REV. 191 (1984) (analyzing the legal standards
applied to the lesser included offense doctrine).
7. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 195, 906 P.2d at 535, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (citing Peo-
ple v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 716, 518 P.2d 913, 921, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-10 (1974)).
8. Id. at 196, 906 P.2d at 536, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574. The defendant argued that a
trial court should only instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if it is consistent
with the defendant's theory of the case and if the defense agrees that the instruction
should be given. Id.
9. Id.
prejudice the defendant."° The defendant insisted that the court's ruling
in People v. Saille" undermined the holding of Sedeno."2 In Saille, the
trial court was not required to give an instruction, absent a request by a
party, that related to specific facts that were elements of the case. 3 Jus-
tice Kennard explained that the instruction in Saille did not concern a
lesser included offense or a defense; therefore, its holding did not affect
Sedeno or Barton.14
The court continued its discussion by stating that the difference be-
tween a lesser included offense and a defense may not be easy to dis-
cern. 5 In Barton, the defense objected to an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter." Voluntary manslaughter is similar to an affirmative de-
fense to murder and therefore its classification as a lesser included of-
fense may be questioned. 7 Nevertheless, the court explained that re-
gardless of whether unreasonable self defense or killing in the heat of
passion motivated the homicide, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser in-
cluded offense within the crime of murder and not a true defense."
The defendant's final argument, that he had no previous notice of the
voluntary manslaughter charge and therefore his due process rights were
violated, was also rejected by the court.9 The court held that because
voluntary manslaughter is a lesser offense included within the crime of
murder, sufficient notice was given.2"
The court concluded by applying the holding in Sedeno to the facts in
the present case.2' The court determined that there was substantial evi-
dence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty of
10. Id. at 197, 906 P.2d at 536, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574.
11. 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1991).
12. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 197-98, 906 P.2d at 537, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
13. Saile, 54 Cal. 3d at 1120, 820 P.2d at 598-99, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75.
14. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 197-98, 906 P.2d at 537, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
15. Id. at 199, 906 P. 2d at 538, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576.
16. Id. at 193, 906 P.2d at 534, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572.
17. Id at 199, 906 P. 2d at 538, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576. The court stated that vol-
untary manslaughter may seem like an affirmative defense because the defense may,
argue the lesser included offense to dispute a charge of murder. Id. Voluntary man-
slaughter, which may arise from a claim of unreasonable self-defense, is similar to a
defense because it includes the word "defense" and because it is linked to the actual
affirmative defense of self-defense. Id. at 199-200, 906 P.2d at 538, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
576.
18. Id. at 200-01, 906 P.2d at 539, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577. The court reasoned that
voluntary manslaughter is a killing which remains a crime regardless of whether it
arises from unreasonable self defense or a sudden heat of passion. Id. Thus, the court
determined that voluntary manslaughter is properly characterized as a lesser included
offense within the crime of murder. Id.
19. Id. at 203, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
20. Id. at 203-204, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
21. Id. at 201-03, 906 P. 2d at 539-41, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577-79.
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voluntary manslaughter.2 The court held that a trial court's duty to
instruct on its own initiative depends on the evidence at trial and not the
arguments of counsel.'
III. IMPACT
Prior to the supreme court's decision in Barton, Sedeno was the last
word on the duty of trial courts to instruct sua sponte on lesser included
offenses.' As evidenced by the present case, there was general confu-
sion regarding a trial court's duty to instruct on defenses and lesser
included offenses and confusion regarding whether voluntary man-
slaughter was a lesser offense included within the crime of murder or a
defense.' The court in Barton emphasized that a trial court has a much
broader duty to instruct on lesser included offenses and counsel need
not request or even agree with the instruction in order for it to be giv-
en.26 The court also reiterated the fact that voluntary manslaughter is
not a defense subject to a trial court's more limited duty to instruct.27
The holding in Barton ensures that the jury will be instructed on all
lesser included offenses that are supported by the evidence at trial.'
When the defense cannot prevent a court from giving all of the relevant
instructions, the jury will not be forced to choose between convicting a
defendant of a greater crime or acquitting simply because the verdict it
would choose is not an option.29
22. Id. at 201-03, 906 P.2d at 539-41, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577-79. The record showed
that the defendant was upset and that he was "[s]creaming and swearing" when he
confronted Sanchez just before the gun discharged. Id. at 202, 906 P.2d at 540, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 578.
23. Id. at 203, 906 P.2d at 54041, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578-79. See generally 5 B.E.
WmaN & NoRMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRINAL LAW, Trial § 2926 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing the court's duty to instruct on lesser included offenses even
when not requested by counsel); 75B AM. JuR. 2D Trial §§ 1427, 1428 (1992 & Supp.
1996) (discussing when instructions on lesser included offenses should be given).
24. See People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
25. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 196-201, 906 P.2d at 536-39, 47 Cal. Rptr 2d at 574-77.
26. Id. at 203, 906 P.2d at 540-41, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578-79; see Alan L Adlestein,
Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Included Offenses at Trial,
37 WM. & MARY L REv. 199 (1995) (discussing the court's duty to instruct sua sponte
versus instructing at the request of counsel).
27. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 203, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579; see supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
28. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 204, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
29. Id. at 196, 906 P.2d at 536, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Barton, the California Supreme Court held that trial courts have a
duty to instruct juries on any lesser included offenses supported by suffi-
cient evidence at trial.' The court held that as long as there is sufficient
evidence at trial, the trial courts can give the instructions on their own
initiative regardless of any opposition by counsel.' The supreme court
also emphasized that trial courts have only a limited duty to instruct sua
sponte on particular defenses.' A trial court can only instruct on a de-
fense if the defendant is relying on that defense, there is substantial evi-
dence supporting the defense, and the defense is consistent with the
defense's theory of the case.' Furthermore, while differences between
a lesser included offense and a defense are sometimes blurred, the su-
preme court clarified that voluntary manslaughter is indeed a lesser in-
cluded offense.'
WENDY M. HUNTER
30. Id. at 204, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579; see Kyron Huigens, The Doc-
trine of Lesser Included Offenses, 16 U. PUGET SouND L REv. 185 (1992) (discussing
the reasoning behind instructing on lesser included offenses); Kyron Huigens, Comment,
Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw. U.L REv. 62 (1962) (same).
31. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th at 203, 906 P.2d at 541, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
32. Id. at 195, 906 P.2d at 535, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 200-01, 906 P.2d at 539, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577.
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B. The sufficiency of an uncorroborated, out-of-court
identification to support a conviction should be
measured by the substantial evidence test:
People v. Cuevas.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Cuevas,' the California Supreme Court overruled People v.
Gould,2 which held that an out-of-court identification that could not be
corroborated at trial was per se insufficient to sustain a conviction in the
absence of other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.3 Re-
versing the decision of the court of appeal,4 the supreme court abolished
Gould's corroboration requirement, deeming it illogical and inconsistent
with state and federal evidence law.5 The court concluded that the sub-
1. 12 Cal. 4th 252, 906 P.2d 1290, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135 (1995). Justice Kennard
authored the court's opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Arabian,
Baxter, George and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 257-77, 906 P.2d at 1292-1306, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 137-51. This case arose from a gang-related shooting in which two gunmen
approached a rival gang's late-night alley party and one of the gunmen opened fire. Id.
at 257-58, 906 P.2d at 1293, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138. Officers interviewed witnesses
Guzman and Gomez separately at the hospital and each stated that "Beto," a West Side
Anaheim gang member, was the shooter, Gomez also identified Cuevas as "Beto" from
a series of photographs. Id. at 258-59, 906 P.2d at 1293, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138. At
trial, Gomez retracted his identification statement, explaining that he had only fingered
Cuevas as "payback" for an earlier, unrelated incident. Id. at 259, 906 P.2d at 1293-94,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. Guzman also recanted his prior statements, denying that he
identified the gunman. Id. at 259, 906 P.2d at 1294, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. The inter-
viewing officers testified to Gomez and Guzman's positive identifications and descrip-
tions of the gunman and another witness, Rodriguez, testified that, at the time of the
shooting, "Gomez exclaimed: 'I know that guy. He's from West Side Anaheim.'" Id. at
259, 906 P.2d at 1294, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. Cuevas was convicted of assault with a
firearm. Id. at 260, 906 P.2d at 1294, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
2. 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
3. Id. at 631, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
4. Although the court of appeal found that Gomez and Guzman's extrajudicial iden-
tification statements corroborated each other as mandated by Gould, it determined that,
by failing to instruct the jury that corroboration was required, the trial court commit-
ted reversible error. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 260, 906 P.2d at 1294, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
139.
5. Id. at 265-67, 906 P.2d at 1298-99, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44.
stantial evidence test6 is the proper standard to determine the sufficien-
cy of an extrajudicial identification to sustain a conviction.7
II. TREATMENT
A. The Gould Exception to the Substantial Evidence Standard
After reviewing the facts, Justice Kennard began a discussion of the
substantial evidence standard.8 Although the substantial evidence test
applies when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned both on appel-
late review and when a trial court is deciding a motion for acquittal,9 the
legislature has carved out a few exceptions which deem limited catego-
ries of evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction.'°
In People v. Gould, the court established an exception to the substantial
evidence standard by requiring corroboration for an extrajudicial identifi-
cation unconfirmed by the witness at trial." On appeal, the Attorney
6. The substantial evidence test was established by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 606 P.2d 738, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980), which held
that the reviewing court must consider "the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier
of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" Id. at 578, 606
P.2d at 751, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 445. See 22 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3763 (1985)
("Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value, and that reasonably inspires confidence."); see also 3 B.E. WrriN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE § 1802 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the Johnson substantial evidence standard).
See generally Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18
SEATTLE U. L REV. 11, 43-45 (1994).
7. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 272, 906 P.2d at 1302, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147. See also
Brenda G. Hamilton, Note, Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identi-
fication: A Critical Analysis of its Admissibility, 54 Mo. L REV. 733, 734-36 (1989);
Christopher M. Walters, Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 73 CAL L REV. 1402, 1402-06 (1985) (discussing the reliability of eyewit-
ness identification).
8. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 260, 906 P.2d at 1294, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. See gener-
ally 6 B.E. WrrN & NORMAN EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Appeal § 3205 (1989
& Supp. 1996) (discussing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction).
9. Pursuant to CAL PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
10. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 261, 906 P.2d at 1295, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. These ex-
ceptions include a corroboration requirement to sustain a conviction on the testimony
of an accomplice. CAL PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). See 6 B.E.
WmaIN & NORMAN EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Appeal §§ 3206, 3208 (1989 &
Supp. 1996); 21 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3264 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
particular evidence which is unsubstantial to sustain a conviction). See generally J. Ar-
thur L Alarcon, Suspect Evidence: Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements and
Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony, 25 Loy. LA. L REV. 953, 960-62 (1992)
11. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 631, 354 P.2d 865, 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278
(1960), rev'd, 12 Cal. 4th 252, 906 P.2d 1290, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135 (1995).
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General challenged the validity of the Gould corroboration requirement,
arguing that post-Gould case law has consistently rejected similar corrob-
oration requirements 2 and that the passage of California Evidence Code
section 411 supplanted the Gould holding. 3 Although the court rejected
the Attorney General's argument on the grounds that the Evidence Code
drafters did not intend to invalidate the Gould requirement, 4 the court
nevertheless elected to overrule Gould to the extent that it requires cor-
roboration for out-of-court identifications. 5
B. A Baseless, Illogical Rule
The court explained that Gould's corroboration requirement directly
conflicts with the substantial evidence test because it concentrates on an
individual piece of evidence to determine whether a conviction is sup-
ported-requiring reversal on appeal if the only evidence proffered is an
uncorroborated out-of-court identification-regardless of the probative
value of the identification. 6 Because "[clorroboration requirements are
the exception, not the rule," and there is a presumption against their use,
they must overwhelningly justify themselves as "useful and effica-
cious"'7 in order to be preserved. Such justification was absent in the
Gould corroboration rule. 8
12. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 262, 906 P.2d at 1295-96, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140-41. The
Attorney General primarily relied on the court's decision in People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d
604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984), which rejected a corroboration require-
ment for the testimony of jailhouse informants. Id. at 623, 685 P.2d at 1135, 205 Cal.
Rptr. at 784.
13. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 262, 906 P.2d at 1295-96, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14041. Cal-
ifornia Evidence Code § 411 states, "[Elxcept where additional evidence is required by
statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient
for proof of any fact" CAL EVID. CODE § 411 (West 1995).
14. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 262-63, 906 P.2d at 1296, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141. The
court based its conclusion on two factors. First, extrajudicial identifications may not
constitute "direct evidence" because they are hearsay evidence which has been previ-
ously deemed indirect evidence by the court. Id. at 263, 906 P.2d at 1296, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 141 (citing Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 629-30, 354 P.2d 865, 869-70, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273,
277-78). Second, Evidence Code § 411 merely intended to restate former Civil Proce-
dure Code § 1844, an action which "would not necessarily abolish the Gould corrobo-
ration requirement." Id. at 263, 906 P.2d at 1296, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
15. Id. at 263, 906 P.2d at 1296, 48 Cal Rptr. 2d at 141.
16. Id. at 263-64, 906 P.2d at 1297, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
17. Id. at 264, 906 P.2d at 1297, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142 (quoting 7 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 2034, at 342 (Chadbourn ed. 1978)).
18. Id. at 264, 906 P.2d at 1297, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
The Gould court based its ruling solely on Reamer v. United States,9
a Sixth Circuit case which refused to sustain a defendant's conviction be-
cause the court found two extrajudicial identifications unreliable and did
not find additional evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.2"
Reamer, however, did not establish a per se rule that out-of-court identi-
fications alone are insufficient to sustain a conviction, nor did it provide
justification for such a rule.21 Additionally, the court found it absurdly
incongruous to sustain a conviction based on an in-court identification
but hold an extrajudicial identification insufficient to support the same
conviction,' or to require corroboration for this type of statement but
not for other forms of hearsay.23
The court also discovered that the requirement was irreconcilable with
other state and federal laws, noting that in the thirty-five years since the
Gould decision, no jurisdiction has adopted the corroboration require-
ment.24 Further, because the Gould corroboration requirement deems all
out-of-court identifications insufficient, regardless of the probative value
of such identifications, it does not consider important circumstances
which may lend credibility to the extrajudicial statement.25 The Gould
corroboration requirement also fails to account for significant factors
regarding the witness' inability to confirm the identification at trial.
Both of these papers may significantly affect the probative value of the
out-of-court statement.27 Had this been a question of first impression,
19. 229 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1956).
20. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 264-65, 906 P.2d at 1297, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 142 (citing
Reamer, 229 F.2d at 886).
21. Id. at 265, 906 P.2d at 1297, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142-143.
22. Id. at 265, 906 P.2d at 1298, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143.
23. Id. at 265-266, 906 P.2d at 1298, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143.
24. Id. at 266-67, 906 P.2d at 1298-99, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44.
25. Id. at 267, 906 P.2d at 1299, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144. These considerations in-
clude: (1) prior contact with the person identified; (2) occasion to view the person
identified; (3) possible iniquitous motive to wrongfully implicate; and (4) the degree of
detail in the identification. Id.
26. Id. at 267-68, 906 P.2d at 1299-1300, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144-45. Such factors
include: (1) whether the identifier admits, denies, or forgets having made the statement
of identification; (2) whether the identifier recalls the event but is unsure of the accu-
racy of the identification; (3) if the identifier claims the statement was false, whether
he is able to justify such a falsification; (4) if the identifier declares memory loss,
whether there is an explanation for such a lack of recall; (5) whether it is shown that
the inability to verify the identification at trial is due to "the witness's appreciation
that doing so would result in the defendant's conviction"; or (6) whether the failure to
verify results stems from "fear or intimidation." Id.
27. Id. at 268, 906 P.2d at 1300, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. To illustrate this point, the
court offered two hypothetical situations in which these factors would affect the proba-
tive value of the identification statement. Id. The first is the situation where the identi-
fication statement has low probative value, in which an imprisoned witness simply tells
his cellmate, in no detail, that he observed the defendant committing the crime. Id. At
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suggested Justice Kennard, the sweeping Gould requirement would be
rejected as overbroad.'
C. The Considerations of Stare Decisis
As this was not a question of first impression, but rather the result of
a thirty-five year old unanimous opinion, the court was forced to evalu-
ate the Gould rule in light of the doctrine of stare decisis.' A cardinal
component of the stare decisis inquiry is the consideration of possible
impact on any "private or legislative reliance interests that have sprung
up in dependence on the existing rule," if the rule were altered.' The
court found no such interests in this case and additionally recognized
that the Gould corroboration rule is a judicially-created, common-law
rule, not a question of statutory interpretation which might force a more
careful consideration before overruling.
3
'
trial, the cellmate recounts the declarant's statement but the declarant denies having
made the statement, knowing anything about the crime, or having any prior knowledge
of the defendant Id. The defense then proves that the witness was not in the same
state as the defendant when the crime occurred and that the cellmate had been as-
sured a sentence reduction for his testimony. Id. In the second scenario, where the
identification statement is highly probative, a witness who has known the defendant for
a length of time gives a videotaped statement after witnessing the defendant perpetrate
the crime, recounting very specific details of the crime. Id. Before trial, the witness
suffers amnesia from a car accident and is unable to confirm her identification state-
ment at trial. Id. Although these two scenarios differ significantly, each is insufficient
under Gould to independently support a conviction. Id. at 269, 906 P.2d at 1300, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 269, 906 P.2d at 1300, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46. The doctrine of stare
decsis requires the court to follow applicable precedent even if reconsideration of the
issue likely would result in a different decision by the current court. Id. at 269, 906
P.2d at 1300-01, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. However, the doctrine does "not shield court-
created error from correction." Id. at 269, 906 P.2d at 1301, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146
(quoting People v. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 1213, 858 P.2d 611, 617, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
144, 150 (1993)). For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, see generally Amy
L Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote,
Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis after Payne v. Tennessee,
82 GEo. LJ. 1689 (1994). See also John Wallace, Note, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist
Court. The Collision of Activism, Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L REV.
187, 189-201 (1994) (discussing the development of stare decisis from its English and
American roots).
30. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 270, 906 P.2d at 1301, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
31. Id. The court noted that the defendant has "a legitimate interest in not being
convicted on evidence that is insufficient to prove" his guilt, but "no defendant has a
The court also noted that the Gould corroboration requirement has
already been limited in two respects where the probative value and reli-
ability of the out-of-court identifications were high.' Based on these
reasons, the court abandoned the corroboration requirement, overruling
Gould to the extent that it deemed all out-of-court identifications inde-
pendently insufficient to sustain a conviction and substituting the sub-
stantial evidence test as the applicable standard.'
D. Ample Defense Safeguards Exist
Responding to the defense's concern that the Gould corroboration
requirement is essential to protect defendants from perjured identifica-
tions, the court pointed out the numerous safeguards that already exist
to guarantee the credibility of extrajudicial identifications.' The first
safeguard, cross-examination of the identifying witness, serves two valu-
able purposes: it provides the jury with the opportunity to observe the
witness' demeanor, and it allows the defense attorney to elicit testimony
regarding possible bias or motive to falsify the identification and to ex-
pose the witness' personal characteristics such as bad eyesight or memo-
ry, both of which may bolster or lessen the witness' credibility in the
eyes of the jury and satisfy the confrontation clause.'
In addition to conducting cross-examination, the defense may present
evidence to impeach the witness' identification' or request appropriate
legitimate interest in holding the prosecution to a greater burden of proof." Id.
32. Id. at 270-71, 906 P.2d at 1301-02, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146-47. See People v.
Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980); People v. Ford, 30
Cal. 3d 209, 635 P.2d 1176, 178 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1981) (holding that a pretrial identifica-
tion made under oath at the preliminary hearing is sufficient in itself to sustain a con-
viction); see also People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1988) (finding that a repudiated extrajudicial identification can be corroborated by the
repudiated extrajudicial statement of another witness which links the defendant to the
crime).
33. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 272, 906 P.2d at 1302-03, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147-48.
34. Id. at 272, 906 P.2d at 1303, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
35. Id. at 272-74, 906 P.2d at 1303-04, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148-49. The court observed
that this notion finds abundant support from several sources including the opinion of
Judge Learned Hand in DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925),
McCormick's treatise on evidence, 2 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 251, p. 120 (4th ed. 1992),
and the United States Supreme Court decision of United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554,
559-60 (1988). See generally Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional
Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration under the Confrntation
Clause, 81 VA. L REv. 149 (1995) (discussing cross-examination of hearsay witnesses as
satisfaction of the confrontation clause).
36. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 274, 906 P.2d at 1304, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149. This in-
cludes "evidence that the identifying witness was not present at the scene of the
crime, was not previously familiar with the defendant, or had a motive to implicate the
defendant." Id.
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jury instructions to apprise the jury of the considerations which may
affect the probative value of the extrajudicial identification.3 7 Finally,
the court advised that the substantial evidence test provides an addition-
al safeguard at both the trial and appellate levels by ensuring that the
conviction is duly supported by evidence.' These protections, the court
concluded, were adequate to guard a defendant from conviction on an
unreliable out-of-court identification.3
E. Due Process Does Not Prevent Retroactive Application of This
Standard
Finally, the court addressed the defendant's contention that due pro-
cess and equal protection prevent the court from retroactively applying
its decision to his case because the holding expands criminal liability.'
The court maintained that adoption of the substantial evidence test to
determine the sufficiency of an extrajudicial identification does not ex-
pand criminal liability because the focus of the test is on the activity for
which the defendant was convicted." That, explained the court, "was
criminal long before this case arose."" Thus, the court adopted the sub-
stantial evidence test and applied it to Cuevas' conviction, holding that
the conviction must stand because, from the evidence, a reasonable jury
could have concluded that the two identifying witnesses were initially
telling the truth but "recanted those statements in court for gang-related
reasons.""
IV. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The Cuevas decision abolished a thirty-five year old California evi-
dence standard, unleashing the possibility for a conviction based on a
single, out-of-court identification that is unconfirmed by the identifier at
trial.' Instead of categorically reversing convictions based on uncorrob-
37. Id.; see CALJIC Nos. 2.91, 2.92 (5th ed. 1988).
38. Cuevas, 12 CaL 4th at 274, 906 P.2d at 1304, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
39. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th at 274-75, 906 P.2d at 1304, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149. All jury
instructions and cases which follow the Gould corroboration requirement are also over-
ruled by this decision "to the extent they are inconsistent with [this opinion]." Id. at
275 n.5, 906 P.2d at 1304 n.5, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149 n.5.
40. Id. at 275, 906 P.2d at 1304-05, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50.
41. Id. at 275, 906 P.2d at 1305, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 276-77, 906 P.2d at 1305-06, 48 CaL Rptr. 2d at 150-151.
44. See 21 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3159, 3263 (1985) (discussing the pre-
orated extrajudicial statements of identification, the court will employ a
case-by-case analysis to weigh the probative value of the statements and
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that
the statements established the elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.
4
The Cuevas decision protects both the community at large and the
confrontation rights of defendants. California defendants will no longer
benefit from improperly influencing identification witnesses through
threat or fear to recant previous identification statements in cases where
the out-of-court identification is the only evidence linking the defendant
to the crime.' Sufficient safeguards still exist to ensure that defendants
will not be convicted solely on a perjured extrajudicial identification.47
JENNIFER COLE POPICK
Cuevas notion that out-of-court identifications are insufficient to support a conviction).
45. See Out of Court Identification Needs No Corroboration, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 22,
1996, at B15; see also supra text accompanying note 43.
46. See supra note 1 and text accompanying note 43.
47. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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C. The required mental state for conspiracy to commit
murder is intent to kill, and a court commits re-
versible error by instructing a jury on theories of
implied malice: People v. Swain.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Swain,' the California Supreme Court granted review to
clarify the required mental state for conspiracy to commit murder.2 Re-
1. 12 Cal. 4th 593, 909 P.2d 994, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390 (1996). Justice Baxter deliv-
ered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices George and
Werdegar joined. Id. at 593-611, 909 P.2d at 994-1004, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390-400. Jus-
tice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Arabian joined. Id. at 611-20,
909 P.2d at 1004-10, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400-06 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Kennard
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 621-30, 909 P.2d at 1011-17, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407-13
(Kennard, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 599, 909 P.2d at 996, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392. Hagbom Saileele, a 15-year-
old youth of Samoan descent, was the victim of a fatal drive-by shooting on January
31, 1991 when he and his friends were listening to music at Hunter's Point in San
Francisco. Id. at 597, 909 P.2d at 995, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391. Later, police discovered
an abandoned van containing two handguns, surgical gloves, and a ski mask. Id. Police
traced one of the guns to defendant Chatman and found defendant Swain's fingerprints
on the inside of the van's driver's side window. Id. The police arrested Chatman and
Swain. Id. While incarcerated before trial, Swain boasted to jailmates about his "good
aim" and described his ability to shoot the youth while traveling 30 miles per hour in
a hilly area. Id. In both his conversations with the police and at trial, Swain contended
he was not in the van on the night of the shooting. Id. The owner of the van testified
that Swain had never been in the van prior to the shooting and that Swain threatened
to harm him if he told police otherwise. Id. at 598, 909 P.2d at 995, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 391.
At trial, Chatman testified that he drove to Hunter's Point to steal a car from a
rival gang and that he fired shots wildly in self-defense. Id. Swain testified that he had
been in the van on the night of the shooting, but that he left before the shooting and
spent the night with a relative. Id. at 598, 909 P.2d at 995-96, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391-
92. Swain denied boasting about the shooting or threatening any witnesses. Id. at 598,
909 P.2d at 996, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of conspiracy and murder,
including principles of implied malice under second-degree murder. Id. at 602, 909 P.2d
at 998, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394. First, the jury returned verdicts finding Chatman guilty
of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree. Id.
at 598, 909 P.2d at 996, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392. Later, the jury returned verdicts find-
ing Swain not guilty of murder or its lesser-included offenses, but found him guilty of
conspiracy and guilty of threatening a witness. Id. The trial court sentenced Chatman
to 15 years for murder, 15 years for conspiracy, and four years for using a firearm in
the commission of a felony. Id. The trial court sentenced Swain to 15 years for con-
spiracy and three years for threatening a witness. Id. at 599, 909 P.2d at 996, 49 Cal.
jecting the theory that a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder
could be sustained on an implied malice jury instruction,3 the supreme
court reversed the court of appeal and held that a specific intent to kill
must be proved.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Required Mental States for Conspiracy and Murder
The court first reviewed the required mental states for conspiracy and
murder.5 The majority emphasized that a conspiracy conviction must be
supported by proof of two specific mental states:6 the intent to conspire
and the intent to commit each element of the target offense.' The court
ruled that a conviction of murder in the first degree requires express
malice or an intent to kill.8 The majority illustrated that a conviction for
murder in the second degree, which both the jury and the court of ap-
peal found to be the target offense, may be based on any of three mental
Rptr. 2d at 392. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions and judgments and im-
posed the full sentences as set forth by the lower court. People v. Swain, 39 Cal. App.
4th 1658, 1664-65, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 602 (1993), vacated, 12 Cal. 4th 593, 909 P.2d
994, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390 (1996).
3. See infr notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
4. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
5. Id. at 598-607, 909 P.2d at 996-1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392-97.
6. Id. at 600, 909 P.2d at 997, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392.
7. Id. (citing People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290, 296, 524 P.2d 1300, 1304, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 516, 520 (1974)). See generally Comment, Developments in the Law--Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L Rsv. 922, 935-40 (1959) (surveying the criminal intent re-
quirement generally); Comment, Criminal Law-Conspiracy and Conspirators in Cali-
fornia, 26 S. CAL. L REV. 64, 67-68 (1952) (providing an historical overview of the
intent requirement in the state of California).
8. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 601, 909 P.2d at 997, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393 (citing Peo-
ple v. Saile, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 1114, 820 P.2d 588, 595, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 371 (1991)).
See Charles L Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L REv. 495,
495-507 (1996) (analyzing inconsistent interpretations of express and implied malice and
advocating comprehensive legislative reform).
[Vol. 24: 725, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
states: unpremeditated murder with express malice,9 implied malice,"°
or second-degree felony murder."
Because conspiracy is a specific-intent crime, the court reasoned that
an implied malice instruction was illogical and thus "at odds with the
very nature of the crime of conspiracy. " 12 The majority concluded that
the specific intent to kill must be proved. 3 Otherwise, the commission
of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder, an inchoate crime that
does not require the successful commission of the target offense, 4
could not be established until and unless a death resulted from an inten-
tional act. 5
9. The mental state of unpremeditated murder with express malice may be found
"'when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evi-
dence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.'" Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at
601, 909 P.2d at 998, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (quoting CALIIC No. 8.30). See People v.
Goodman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 705, 708-09, 87 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666-67 (1970) (holding that de-
liberate intent to kill is not an element of second-degree murder), overruled on other
grounds by, People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). See
generaUy 1 B.E. WrrIuN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against the Person §§ 490-491 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing lack of premedi-
tation and insufficient provocation).
10. Implied malice may be found when three elements are prove&i first, a killing
must result from an intentional act; second, the natural consequences of that act must
be dangerous to human life; and third, that act must be deliberately performed with
knowledge of danger to human life or a conscious disregard for human life. See, e.g.,
People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 759-60, 518 P.2d 342, 349, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 917
(1974). See generaly 1 B.E. WrriN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Crimes Against the Person §§ 503-507 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing theories
of implied malice where intentional acts involve risk of death or injury).
11. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 601-02, 909 P.2d at 997-98, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-94. A
second degree felony-murder instruction is appropriate when the unlawful killing of a
human being accompanies the commission of a felony and the perpetrator acted with
the specific intent to commit that felony; malice need not be proved. See, e.g., People
v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 475-76 & n.23, 668 P.2d 697, 718 & n.23, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390,
411-12 & n.23 (1983). See generalty 1 B.E. WrrIN & NORMAN L EPsTFMN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against the Person §§ 474, 493-500 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing second-degree felony murder rule).
12. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 603, 909 P.2d at 999, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395.
13. Id. at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 397.
14. Id. at 599, 909 P.2d at 996, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 392 (citing United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975)); People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1, 47, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275,
301 (1977) (ruling that agreement between two people to rob and murder an unidenti-
fied victim, combined with an overt act in furtherance of the crime, constitutes con-
spiracy).
15. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 603, 909 P.2d at 999, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395.
While the court arrived at this conclusion with little effort, it had to
reconcile the result with apparently inconsistent language in People v.
Horn.6 In a footnote, the Horn court reasoned that conspiracy to com-
mit second-degree murder or manslaughter was legally cognizable. 7 The
majority distinguished Horn on two grounds. First, at the time the court
decided Horn, premeditation required proof that one "could maturely and
meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act.""8 Second,
when the court decided Horn, an allegation of express malice could be
rebutted by a showing of diminished capacity." Noting that nothing in
Horn suggested that a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder could
be sustained on a theory of implied malice, the court asserted that its
present decision did not require overruling Horn.2'
2. Harmless Error Standard
As in other cases where a jury receives improper instructions,2' the
majority applied the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v.
California.' Because the trial court gave the jury instructions on both
express and implied malice, and because the jury returned general ver-
dicts that failed to indicate the theory upon which they based their sec-
ond-degree conspiracy convictions,' the court was unable to conclude
16. 12 Cal. 3d 290, 524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1974). In Horn, the defen-
dants were convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, arson, and the un-
lawful manufacture of a firebomb. Id. at 293, 524 P.2d at 1301, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
At trial, the defendants claimed that they were so intoxicated that they lacked capacity
to form the intent to kill, but the trial court refused to instruct the jury on a dimin-
ished capacity defense. Id. at 293, 524 P.2d at 1301-02, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18. When
the court decided Horn, evidence of a diminished mental capacity could show that a
homicide was committed without premeditation or malice aforethought and the lan-
guage of Penal Code § 182 made conspiracy to commit second-degree murder a logical
possibility. Id. at 295 & n.5, 524 P.2d at 1303 & n.5, 115 Cal. Rplr. at 519 & n.5.
17. Id. at 295 & n.5, 524 P.2d at 1303 & n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 519 & n.5. By failing
to instruct the jury about the defense of diminished capacity, the court held that the
trial court "effectively emasculated" the defendants of manslaughter verdicts and re-
versed their convictions. Id. at 291, 524 P.2d at 1306-07, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23.
18. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 606, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397 (quoting
Horn, 12 Cal. 3d at 298, 524 P.2d at 1305, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 521).
19. Id. (citing Horn, 12 Cal. 3d at 298, 524 P.2d at 1305, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 521).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 9 Cal. 4th 407, 424-25, 886 P.2d 1193, 1203-04, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994) (citing list of cases applying harmless error standard where
the jury is improperly instructed), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2280 (1995)).
22. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman standard requires reversal unless it can be
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that "the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24.
23. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found an intent to kill and
therefore reversed the defendants' conspiracy convictions.'
3. Conspiracy and Second-Degree Murder
Because the court left Horn's holding and "controversial footnote"'
intact, it grappled with the "conceptually difficult" issue of whether it is
possible to convict a person of conspiracy to commit murder in the sec-
ond degree.' The majority refused to decide that a murder conspirator
must agree to conunit first-degree murder." Rather, the court held only
that a conviction cannot be based on a second-degree theory of implied
malice.' The court suggested that a conviction of conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder would not necessarily be inconsistent with its
holding so long as it was based on unpremeditated express malice'
rather than on a theory of implied malice.'
The majority concluded by declining to decide either the appropriate
punishment for conspiring to commit second-degree murder or whether
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy barred the
defendants' retrial.3
24. Id. at 607, 909 P.2d at 1002, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398.
25. Id. at 609, 909 P.2d at 1003, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399. The footnote in Horn
states in pertinent part:
[The] assertion that a conspiracy to conunit murder is always a conspiracy to
commit first degree murder is inconsistent with the present language of Penal
Code section 182 .... As this language is written and punctuated, it plainly
authorizes the trier of fact to return a verdict finding conspiracy to commit
murder in the second degree ... . Since the Legislature has authorized a
verdict of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, it dearly does not
believe that crime to be a logical impossibility.
People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d at 298 n.5, 524 P.2d at 1305 n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 521 n.5
(1974). The Swain court reasoned that its decision in Horn could stand because the
footnote was only dicta and because the decision failed to address the specific issue
of whether a conviction for conspiracy could be sustained when the intent to commit
the substantive offense was implied rather than proved. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 606, 610,
909 P.2d at 1001, 1003, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397, 399.
26. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 608, 909 P.2d at 1002, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398.
27. Id. at 608-10, 909 P.2d at 1002-04, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398-400.
28. Id. at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 397.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining express malice).
30. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 610, 909 P.2d at 1003, 49 Cal Rptr. 2d at 399.
31. Id. at 610, 909 P.2d at 1004, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred in the result on the narrow ground that the
crime of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder does not exist.'
He departed from the court's determination of the required mental state
for first-degree murder, stating that malice aforethought does not require
"a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill unlawfully."' Justice Mosk,
who dissented in Horn,' sought to overrule that decision,' describing
it as a "citation without substance "' that "has been wanting from the
day it was decided."37 He disagreed with the majority that murder con-
spiracies could be classified into degrees;' rather, he stated that only a
"conspiracy to commit murder simpliciter" existed as a matter of law.'
Reaching decisions on issues not discussed by the majority," Justice
Mosk stated that the punishment for conspiracy to commit murder
should necessarily conform to that of first-degree murder.4 Justice
32. Id. at 619, 909 P.2d at 1010, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 406 (Mosk, J., concurring). Rea-
soning that the prosecution did not support the "crime" of conspiracy to commit mur-
der in the second degree as a matter of law, Justice Mosk wrote that he would not
allow the judgment to stand on the narrow ground of due process. Id. (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
33. Id. at 613, 909 P.2d at 1005-06, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401-02 (Mosk, J., concurring).
"It is evident that the mental state required for the crime of murder is malice afore-
thought Intent to kill is not necessary .... [Ilt is satisfied by the presence of an
'abandoned and maligned heart' or the absence of 'considerable provocation.'" Id. at
612 n.2, 909 P.2d at 1005 n.2, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401 n.2 (Mosk, J., concurring) (quot-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE § 188).
34. See People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290, 301-04, 524 P.2d 1300, 1307-09, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 516, 523-25 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "there are no degrees of
conspiracy" and that a jury "has no comfortable option of reducing conspiracy to a
lesser offense").
35. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 615-17, 909 P.2d at 1007-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403-04
(Mosk, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 617, 909 P.2d at 1008, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (Mosk, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 615, 909 P.2d at 1007, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403 (Mosk, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Mosk preferred the opinion of People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 745, 104 P.2d
794, 801 (1940), which held that the crime of conspiracy to commit murder can only
be found in the first degree. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 613-17, 909 P.2d at 1006-08, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 402-04 (Mosk, J., concurring).
38. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 613-17, 909 P.2d at 1006-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402-04
(Mosk, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 619, 909 P.2d at 1009, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (Mosk, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 611-20, 909 P.2d at 1004-10, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400-06 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). Justice Mosk criticized the majority for balking on the sentencing and double
jeopardy questions and allowing those issues to "cause mischief' and result in "years
of unnecessary litigation" in lower courts. Id. at 611 n.1, 909 P.2d at 1004 n.1, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 400 n.1 (Mosk, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 619, 909 P.2d at 1009, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (Mosk, J., concurring). Cali-
fornia Penal Code § 190(a) provides that conspiracy to commit murder is punishable
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Mosk further stated that the defendants could be retried without offend-
ing the protection against double jeopardy.42 However, he stated that
fair notice principles of due process precluded sentencing the defendants
to a duration greater than those enumerated in Horn.'
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that an unlawful intent to kill
must be proved in order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit
murder.' However, unlike the majority's equivocation, Justice Kennard
praised Horn's logic45 and stated that conspiracy to commit first degree
murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder were separate
crimes that deserved separate punishments." She reasoned that the cor-
by imprisonment for a term of 25 years to life. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 1996).
42. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 619-20, 909 P.2d at 1010, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 406 (Mosk,
J., concurring). Justice Mosk reasoned that because the prosecution tried the defen-
dants under the theories of conspiracy to commit murder in the first and second de-
grees-rather than under the theory of "conspiracy to commit murder simplici-
ter"-that they would not be prosecuted twice for the same offense. Id. (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (holding that
principles of double jeopardy protect persons from being prosecuted twice for the
.same offense" regardless of the jury's verdict)). See generally -William S. Theis, The
Double Jeopardy Defense and Multiple Prosecutions for Conspiracy, 49 SMU L REv.
269, 284-91 (1996) (reviewing Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy and
multiple conspiracies).
43. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 620, 909 P.2d at 1010, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 406 (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (noting "a de-
privation of the right of fair warning can result ... from an unforeseeable and ret-
roactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language") and Beazell v.
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925) (holding that a retroactive application of the law vio-
lates due process if the punishment is "more burdensome")). Thus, Justice Mosk rea-
soned that, if found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder on retrial, the defendants
should be sentenced to terms of 15 years to life. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
44. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 621, 909 P.2d at 1011, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
45. Id. at 623-25, 909 P.2d at 1012-14, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408-10 (Kennard, J., con-
curring).
46. Id. at 621, 909 P.2d at 1011, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard stated that the rationale for Horn's dual classification for. conspiracies
was easily seen because of the disparity in punishment
If conspiracy to [commit] murder were a unitary crime that required only
intent to kill, which is the mental state of second degree murder, but was
punished as first degree murder, then conspiracies that involve agreements to
commit only the elements of second degree . . . murder would be punished
more severely than the completed crime of second degree murder.
rect charge depended upon whether the intent to kill was deliberate and
premeditated,47 emphasizing that an inordinately small number of cases
would comprise the second-degree classification because an agreement
"persisting beyond more than the briefest duration" would constitute
deliberation and premeditation.'
Justice Kennard also suggested that the defendants could be retried
without violating the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.'
Because she concluded that conspiracy to commit second-degree express
malice murder was a crime as a matter of law,' Justice Kennard rea-
soned that the defendants could be retried because the court convicted,
rather than acquitted, both defendants, of conspiracy to commit second-
degree murder.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The court's decision in People v. Swain makes clear two concepts. The
required mental state for conspiracy to commit murder is an intent to
kill,52 and a court may not instruct a jury on an implied malice theory.'
However, whether a court may instruct on a second-degree murder theo-
ry of unpremeditated express malice and whether defendants may be
retried after an erroneous instruction are issues left undecided by the
California Supreme Court.' Because the legislature amended Penal
Id. at 625, 909 P.2d at 1013-14, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409-10 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard concluded that each classification for conspiracy to commit murder
should reflect the sentence provided by the appropriate degree of murder. Id. at 621,
909 P.2d at 1011, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (Kennard, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 624, 909 P.2d at 1013, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409 (Kennard, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 625, 909 P.2d at 1014, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 410 (Kennard, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 628-30, 909 P.2d at 1015-17, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411-13 (Kennard, J., con-
curring). See generaUy George C. Thomas I, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecu-
tions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOwA L. REv. 323 (1986)
(analyzing the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence).
50. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 629, 909 P.2d at 1016, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
51. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring) (citing Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 (1987)
("It is a venerable principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence that the successful appeal
of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict, poses no bar to further prosecution on the same
charge.")) (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted); see People v.
Santamaria, 8 Cal. 4th 903, 910-11, 884 P.2d 81, 83, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 626 (1994)
(stating that the double jeopardy clause's protections against successive prosecution do
not preclude the government from retrying a defendant who successfully sets aside his
conviction due to a procedural error).
52. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
53. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (discussing conspiracy as a spe-
cific-intent crime).
54. Id. at 621, 909 P.2d at 1011, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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Code section 189 to include drive-by shootings on the list of specified
felonies in which an intent to kill will be presumed, lower courts will be
guided should facts similar to Swain arise in the future.' Meanwhile,
California's conspiratorial homicide laws remain unsettled as the void
caused by "piecemeal" judicial interpretation' and incomplete statutory
abrogation becomes more confusing."
JONATHAN SIMONDS PYATT
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1996); Anthony M. Perez & Tammy L Samsel,
Review of Selected 1993 Calfornia Legislation: Crimes; Carjacking and Drive-by
Shooting-First Degree Murder, 25 PAC. L.J. 513 (1994).
56. Hobson, supra note 8, at 495. Mr. Hobson argues that the judiciary's attempts to
solve problems created by California's "archaic" homicide statutes have largely failed
and that only sweeping legislative reform "can correct the errors of the past and limit
future errors from further confusing homicide law." Id.
57. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 613-17, 909 P.2d at 1006-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402-04
(Mosk, J., concurring).
IV. EMPLOYER & EMPLOYEE
An employer's course of conddict and representations
may create an enforceable, implied-in-fact contract pro-
hibiting the employer from demoting an employee with-
out cause: Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,' the California Supreme Court
considered whether courts can enforce implied terms in employment
contracts that prohibit employers from demoting employees without
cause.2 At trial, the jury found for Scott and Johnson, determining that
the parties entered into an agreement preventing Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) from demoting its employees without cause and that
PG&E breached the agreement by demoting the two employees without
good cause.3 The court of appeal reversed the trial court's judgment,
1. 11 Cal. 4th 454, 904 P.2d 834, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (1995). Justice Mosk
authored the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, and George concurred. Id. at 458-74, 904 P.2d at 834-46, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
428-39. Justice Puglia, presiding Justice for the Third District Court of Appeal, and
Justice Cottle, presiding Justice for Sixth District Court of Appeal, sitting under assign-
ment, also concurred in the opinion. Id.
2. Id. at 463, 904 P.2d at 838, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431. Scott and Johnson were em-
ployees of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) working as engineering consul-
tants. Id. at 459, 904 P.2d at 836, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429. During their employment,
Scott and Johnson worked off-hoursto form S&J Engineering (990), an outside engi-
neering consulting business. Id. PG&E was fully aware of Scott and Johnson's involve-
ment in S&J and did not have any policies against outside business involvement as
long as it did not create a conflict of interest with PG&E. Id. During the end of 1988,
PG&E's internal auditing department began investigating Scott's and Johnson's supervi-
sorial practices and outside business interests. Id. Scott and Johnson alleged that the
investigation was prompted by personal animosity harbored against them by Ralf Stew-
art, an investigator in the internal auditing department. Id. Due to the investigation,
Scott and Johnson were charged with negligent supervision and conflicts of interest.
Id. at 460, 904 P.2d at 836, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429. On August 9, 1989, Scott and
Johnson were suspended without having an opportunity to respond to the charges. Id.
Approximately one month passed before Scott and Johnson were allowed to read the
internal audit report and prepare a response. Id. at 460, 904 P.2d at 836-37, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 429-30. Although their response contained extensive documentary support
for their denials of wrongdoing, Scott and Johnson were demoted in October of 1989.
Id. at 460, 904 P.2d at 837, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430. Testimony by personnel supervi-
sors revealed that the decision to demote Scott and Johnson was made in July of
1989, one month before Scott and Johnson were allowed to defend against the charges.
Id. Feeling that they were unfairly demoted, Scott and Johnson sued for breach of
contract, claiming that PG&E breached an implied agreement not to demote employees
without cause. Id.
3. Id. at 462, 904 P.2d at 838, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
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reasoning that a contract action for wrongful demotion was "inherently
vague" and that judicial activism in employment demotion disputes
would create uncertainty and intrusion and, therefore, is unwarranted.4
The California Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court
and held that a cause of action does exist for breach of an implied con-
tractual agreement not to demote an employee without good cause.59
H. TREATMENT
The court began its analysis by reviewing the principles set forth in
employment contract statutes and cases.' Section 2922 of the California
Labor Code creates a presumption that employment for an indefinite
period of time is terminable at the will of either the employer or the
employee.' This presumption is similar to the common law presumption
that an employer may demote an employee at his or her discretion.8
However, the court acknowledged its holding in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.,9 that the presumption of at-will employment can be over-
come by proof of contractual agreements."° As the Foley court deter-
mined, an employer's representations and conduct indicating that em-
ployment will not be terminated without good cause may create an im-
plied-in-fact agreement not to terminate an employee without cause."
The court explained that the terms of an agreement, as well as the
parties' understanding, as manifested by their conduct, form the basis for
determining contractual rights and liabilities. 2 Therefore, the court con-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 474, 904 P.2d at 846, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
6. Id. at 463, 904 P.2d at 838, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
7. Id. California Labor Code § 2922 states in pertinent part "An employment, hav-
ing no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the
other." CAL LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
8. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 464-65, 904 P.2d at 839-40, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432-33.
9. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
10. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 463, 904 P.2d at 838, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
11. Id.; see Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 679-80, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225. See
generally 2 B.E. WITKn, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Agency and Employment § 156
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the requirement of good cause in the employ-
ment termination context); 29 CAL JUR. 3D Employer and Employee § 72 (1986 &
Supp. 1996) (stating that a breach of an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate an
employee without cause may give rise to a cause of action).
12. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 463, 904 P.2d at 838, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431. "'[C]ourts
seek to enforce the actual understanding of the parties to a contract, and in so doing
may inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if it demonstrates an implied con-
tract.'" Id. (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 677, 765 P.2d at 385, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223).
cluded that the presumption of an employer's right to demote without
cause may be overcome by proof of an implied contractual agreement to
the contrary.3
In determining whether PG&E's right to demote without cause was
overcome by an implied agreement to the contrary, the court examined
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
of an implied agreement limiting PG&E from exercising its discretion to
demote Scott and Johnson. 4 The court found that PG&E's personnel
policy manual and statements from a PG&E personnel director, which
indicated that employees had a reasonable expectation that PG&E would
not discipline its employees without good cause, constituted compelling
evidence to conclude that PG&E implicitly entered into an agreement not
to demote its employees without good cause. 5
Having found an implied agreement to demote only for cause, the
court then analyzed whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding of a breach of this agreement by PG&E."6 Because
the evidence was sufficient to show that Scott and Johnson did not have
any conflicting interests in running their other business, and because
PG&E failed to follow its personnel policies in dealing with its employ-
ees, the court concluded that PG&E's demotion of Scott and Johnson
constituted a breach of its implied agreement. 7
Next, the court analyzed PG&E's arguments that contractual agree-
ments which limit an employer's right to demote at will should not be
The court further explained that the application of this realistic approach to contract
interpretation means that courts will not confine themselves to examining the express
agreements . .. but will also look to the employer's policies, practices, and communi-
cations in order to discover the contents of an employment contract." Scott, 11 Cal.
4th at 463, 904 P.2d at 839, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432; see also 1 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 11 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (distinguishing between
express and implied contracts); 2 B.E. WrnaN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNIA LAW, Agency
and Employment §§ 171-174 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (describing the effects of
implied contracts on at-will employment); 14 CAL JUR. 3D Contracts §§ 180-181 (1974
& Supp. 1996) (describing the creation of implied-in-fact contract terms).
13. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 465, 904 P.2d at 840, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433. "We perceive
no reason under the principles enunciated in Foley why the presumption that an em-
ployer has the right to demote an employee at will may not also be rebutted by evi-
dence of a contractual agreement, express or implied, to limit the employer's power of
demotion." Id.
14. Id. ("When considering a claim of insufficient evidence on appeal, we do not
reweigh the evidence, but rather determine whether, after resolving all conflicts favor-
ably to the prevailing party, and according the prevailing party the benefit of all rea-
sonable inferences, there is substantial evidence to support the judgment.").
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465-66, 904 P.2d at 840, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433.
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enforced. The court dismissed PG&E's first contention that a contrac-
tual agreement requiring good cause prior to demoting an employee
would be unenforceably vague. 9 The court reasoned that the re-
quirement of good cause was not unenforceably vague because good
cause could be shown to exist whenever an employer had a fair and true
reason for his or her actions." PG&E's second contention, that Scott
and Johnson's cause of action should be dismissed because their demo-
tions did not constitute constructive discharges, was similarly rejected by
the court."' The court noted that the laws regulating constructive dis-
charge causes of action' did not prevent a suit for breach of an implied
agreement not to demote without cause because the two causes of ac-
tion differ, and Scott and Johnson were not seeking the same damages as
would be allowed in a constructive discharge suit.'
The court rebutted PG&E's final claim that implied contractual agree-
ments requiring good cause prior to demoting an employee are unen-
forceable because of public policy considerations.~' The court found
18. Id. at 466-74, 904 P.2d at 840-46, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433-39.
19. Id. at 466-67, 904 P.2d at 840-41, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433-34. See generally 1 B.E.
WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNiA LAW, Contracts §§ 145, 146 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1996) (describing the requirement of certainty in contract terms).
20. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 467, 904 P.2d at 841, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434. Good cause
means "a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the
party exercising the power." Id. (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981) (quoting R. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 145, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 558 (1963))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For a discussion of the requirements imposed on employers to terminate an employee
for cause, see Michael D. Fabiano, Note, The Meaning of Just Cause for Termination
When an Employer Alleges Misconduct and the Employee Denies It, 44 HASTINGS U.
399 (1993).
21. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th. at 467-68, 904 P.2d at 841-42, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434-35.
22. A constructive discharge occurs whenever an employer creates an intolerable
working condition which effectively coerces the employee to resign. Id. at 468, 904
P.2d at 842, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435. See generally Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Con-
structive Discharge: The Misapplication of Constructive Discharge Standards in Em-
ployment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 39 (1995) (identifying the
standards for a constructive discharge cause of action in employment discrimination
cases); April Lorraine Anstett, Note, California Supreme Court Survey: Review of Deci-
sions: Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 22 PEPP. L REv. 1795 (1995) (sununarizing the
California Supreme Court's decision in Turner which defined the elements necessary
for a cause of action for constructive discharge).
23. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 468, 904 P.2d at 842, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
24. Id. at 468-70, 904 P.2d at 842-43, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435-36. PG&E relied on
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 876 P.2d 487, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 1 (1994), for the proposition that public policy considerations may make em-
that such agreements have been noted by scholars to be beneficial to the
employer-employee relationship.25 Additionally, the court found that
public policy does not render the agreements unenforceable because of
the voluntary nature of such agreements.2'
H. IMPACT
The California Supreme Court decided that implied agreements not to
demote employees without cause are enforceable." The court deter-
mined that a company's communications, practices, and procedures
could form the basis of an implied-in-fact agreement not to demote an
employee without cause.' An issue for consideration is how employers
can protect themselves from blindly entering into implied agreements.
The court stated that the burden of limiting exposure to such implied
liabilities lies on the employer.' However, the court did not state how
an employer could limit his or her exposure to such implied liabilities. Is
it possible for a company to protect itself by placing disclaimers in each
policy manual and in each employment contract stating that the company
is not responsible for any implied liabilities?' The court purposely did
not decide whether disclaimers in employment contracts would immu-
nize employers from implied agreements.3'
ployment contracts unenforceable. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 468-69, 904 P.2d at 842, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 435; see also Christopher L Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Ex-
ception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL
L. REv. 1583 (1994) (focusing on the role of public policy in employment contracts).
For a discussion of General Dynamics, see Michelle M. Gubola, Note, In-House
Attorneys' Claim for Wrongful Discharge: General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,
876 P.2d 487 (Cal, 1994), 64 U. CIN. L REv. 227 (1995).
25. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 469, 904 P.2d at 843, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436. See, e.g.,
Chimezie A.B. Osigweh & William R Hutchinson, Positive Discipline, 28 Hum. RE-
SOURCES MGrr. 367, 382 (1989) (stating that a policy of positive discipline reduces
employee absenteeism).
26. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 470, 904 P.2d at 843, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436 ("Whatever the
benefits or detriments of [an employer's] adopting a disciplinary system . . . we cannot
say that an employer's voluntary commitment to such a policy is contrary to public
policy.").
27. Id. at 474, 904 P.2d at 846, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
28. Id. at 463, 904 P.2d at 839, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
29. "[W]e nonetheless find no basis to the argument that employers who consistently
articulate and implement policies designed to preserve their traditional managerial pre-
rogatives lack the capacity to limit their exposure to implied contractual liability." Id.
at 472, 904 P.2d at 845, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438.
30. For an article addressing disclaimers, see Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of
Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U. LQ. 1131, 1140-53
(1992) (describing the law regarding disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability).
31. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 472, 904 P.2d at 839, 46 Cal Rptr. 2d at 438.
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The court recognized that an employer's policies and procedures may
give rise to an implied agreement.' Companies, however, often change
their practices and procedures over time as business necessitates. 3
Thus, a further issue in need of consideration is whether a company may
alter its implied agreements with its employees by simply altering its
policies.' If the enumeration of a company's policies creates an implied
agreement,' does the alteration of its policies also alter the agreement?
If a company alters its policies and the change affects the employees,
will the company have to prove that it had good cause to make the
changes?' These questions will undoubtedly be answered by the courts
as they are faced with the ramifications of Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric Co.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court decided that implied-in fact agreements
in employment contracts, limiting an employer's ability to demote an
employee without cause, are enforceable.37 Because there was sufficient
evidence to show that PG&E implicitly entered into an agreement not to
demote its employees without good cause, and because PG&E breached
this agreement, the court held that Scott and Johnson could recover for
wrongful demotion.'
ROLAND T. KELLY
32. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 463, 904 P.2d at 839, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
33. For a discussion of corporate downsizing and the resulting legal implications, see
Frank C. Morris, Litigation Challenges to Reductions in Force, in Employment Dis-
crimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts, (A.LI.-A.B.A.
Course of Study, June 1, 1995), available in WESTLAW, C108 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 181 (1995).
34. See generally Stephen Carey Sullivan, Unilateral Modification of Employee
Handbooks: A Contractual Analysis, 5 REGENT U. L REV. 262 (1995) (examining
whether an employer can unilaterally modify an employee handbook and thus modify
contractual rights).
35. See Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 463, 904 P.2d at 839, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
36. It should be recognized that employers will have to deal fairly with their em-
ployees and act in good faith pursuant to the implied-in-law covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See generally 29 CAL JuR. 3D Employer and Employee § 73 (1986 &
Supp. 1995) (detailing the cause of action in tort and in contract for breach of the
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
37. Scott, 11 Cal. 4th at 465, 904 P.2d at 840, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433.
38. Id. at 466, 904 P.2d at 840, 46 CaL Rptr. 2d at 433.
V. EMPLOYER LIABILITY
A. An'employee who sexually harasses co-workers will
not be able to seek indemnity from the employer
when the conduct is not a risk that may fairly be
regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the
operation of the employer's enterprise: Farmers
Insurance Group v. County of Santa Clara.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Farmers Insurance Group v. County of Santa Clara,1 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered whether the County of Santa Clara (Coun-
ty) had to indemnify a deputy sheriff and pay his expenses from defend-
ing a sexual harassment suit brought by other county sheriffs.2 The su-
1. 11 Cal. 4th 992, 906 P.2d 440, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478 (1995). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, George, and
Werdegar concurred. Id. at 997-1020, 906 P.2d at 444-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482-97.
Justice Baxter filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1020, 906 P.2d at 459, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 497 (Baxter, J., concurring). Justice George filed a concurring opinion in which
Chief Justice Lucas joined. Id. at 1020-23, 906 P.2d at 459-61, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-
99 (George, J., concurring). Justice Werdegar filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1023-25,
906 P.2d at 461-63, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499-501 (Werdegar, J., concurring). Justice Mosk
filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1025-37, 906 P.2d at 463-71, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501-09
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1038-48, 906
P.2d at 471-78, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509-16 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 997, 906 P.2d at 444, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482. In 1980, the County of San-
ta Clara enacted a policy forbidding sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. at 998,
906 P.2d at 444, 47 CaL Rptr. 2d at 482. See Nancy L. Abell et al., Recent Develop-
ments in Sexual Harassment Litigation, in Employment Discrimination and Civil
Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts, (A.LI.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Apr. 28,
1994) available in WESTLAW, C902 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 637, 668 ("Where an employer has an
established policy prohibiting sexual harassment, indemnity for tort liability is highly
unlikely."). In 1983 and 1984, Deputy Sheriff Craig Nelson "made lewd, suggestive, and
sexually offensive comments" to Deputy Sheriff Cynthia Bates and touched her legs.
Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 998, 906 P.2d at 444-45, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482-83. In 1984,
while Nelson was Bates' training officer, Nelson admits that he continued his sexually
offensive comments and conduct toward Bates. Id.
In 1984, Nelson also harassed Deputy Sheriff Toni Daugherty. Id. at 999, 906 P.2d
at 445, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483. In addition to Nelson's indecent conduct and comments
to Daugherty, Nelson began making obscene phone calls to Daugherty's home after she
reported his behavior. Id.
After Bates and Daugherty reported their experiences, Deputy Sheriff Zana Murphy
came forward and said that Nelson had also made offensive comments to her. Id. Fol-
lowing an investigation, the sheriffs department suspended Nelson without pay for 14
days which an aribitrator later reduced to two days. Id.
The female deputies complained about another deputy and alleged that the lieu-
tenants did not act in a timely manner in investigating their complaints. Id. Following
an investigation, the County determined that the claims were unfounded. Id.
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preme court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and directed
the court to vacate the judgment for Farmers and enter judgment in
favor of the County.3 The California Supreme Court held that an employ-
ee who sexually harasses co-workers will not be able to seek indemnity
from the employer if the behavior "is not a risk that may fairly be regard-
ed as typical of or broadly incidental to the operation of" the employer's
enterprise.4
II. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Torts Claim Act
Justice Baxter first discussed the Tort Claims Act which requires that
a public entity defend a public employee and pay any judgment against a
public employee in a civil action.5 Section 995 of the Tort Claims Act
provides in pertinent part: "a public entity shall provide for the defense
of any civil action or proceeding brought against him, in his official or
In 1987, Bates, Daugherty and Murphy filed suit against Nelson, the County and
other County employees. Id, The County denied Nelson's request to defend and indem-
nify him stating that he acted outside the scope of his employment during the inci-
dents of sexual harassment. Id. Farmers Insurance Group (Farmers) paid for Nelson's
legal representation through his homeowner's insurance policy. Id. at 1000, 906 P.2d at
445, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
Murphy's action against Nelson was later dismissed, and Nelson later settled with
Bates and Daugherty for $150,000 which was paid by Farmers. Id. at 1000, 906 P.2d at
445-46, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483-84. See 5 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Torts § 32 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) ("An agent or employee is always liable for his
own torts, whether his employer is liable or not."). The claims against the County con-
tinued and a jury awarded damages to all three of the female deputies. Farmers, 11
Cal. 4th at 1000, 906 P.2d at 446, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
Farmers and Nelson then brought an action against the County seeking indemnity
for the amount of Nelson's settlement and the cost of Nelson's defense. Id. The trial
court found that Nelson acted outside the scope of his employment but the court of
appeal disagreed. Id. at 1000-01, 906 P.2d at 446, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483. The appellate
court found that "Nelson's misconduct occurred on the jail premises while the deputies
were in uniform and on duty, and that Nelson had authority over Bates and could give
direct orders that she had to obey." Id. at 1001, 906 P.2d at 446, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
483. Thus, the court of appeal directed the trial court to grant Farmers and Nelson's
motion for summary judgment Id.
3. Id. at 1020, 906 P.2d at 459, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497.
4. Id. at 997, 906 P.2d at 444, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
5. Id. See CAL Gov. CODE §§ 825, 995 (West 1995).
individual capacity or both, on account of an act or omission in the
scope of his employment as an employee of the public entity."6 The
court observed that the statutory provisions place the burden on the
public employee to establish that the conduct was within the scope of
the employment.7 The majority agreed with the County's position that
Nelson's acts were, as a matter of law, outside the scope of his employ-
ment.'
The court thoroughly discussed what the phrase "within the scope of
employment" encompassed.9 Justice Baxter noted that "the employer's
liability extends beyond his actual or possible control of the employee to
include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise.""° To determine
whether liability will extend, Justice Baxter set forth the foreseeability
test for respondeat superior which considers whether the actions of an
employee are "unusual or startling.""
The majority presented various rules reflecting California's liberal in-
terpretation of what is meant by scope of employment, but emphasized
"that an employer is not strictly liable for all actions of its employees
during working hours." 2 The court further asserted that "[i]f an
employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of em-
ployment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to
the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer
under the doctrine of respondeat superior."1
6. CAL. Gov. CODE § 995 (West 1995). See generally 35 CAL' JuR. 3D Government
Tort Liability § 138 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (explaining indemnification rights of public
employees).
7. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1002, 906 P.2d at 447, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485.
8. Id. at 1003, 906 P.2d at 447, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
9. Id. at 1003-19, 906 P.2d at 447-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485-97. See generally 29
CAL Jua 3D Employer and Employee § 107 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (interpreting the
phrase "within the scope of employment").
10. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1003, 906 P.2d at 448, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486 (citing
Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. 41 Cal. 3d 962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1986) (finding employer vicariously liable for the plaintiffs injuries when the plaintiff
fell from a tractor operated by his uncle since the uncle/employee was acting within
the scope of his employment)).
11. Id. See generally 29 CAL JuR. 3D Employer and Employee § 108 (1986 & Supp.
1995) (defining foreseeability in the context of respondeat superior).
12. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1004, 906 P.2d at 449, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
13. Id. at 1005, 906 P.2d at 449, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487 (quoting Alma W. v. Oak-
land Unified Sch. Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 140, 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (1981)). See
29 CAL JuR. 3D Employer and Employee § 110 (1986 & Supp. 1995) ("In order to
exonerate the employer from liability for the acts of the employee it is essential that
the employee's deviation from his duty be for entirely personal purposes.").
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2. Respondeat Superior Doctrine
Justice Baxter went on to compare the instant case with numerous
other cases dealing with the respondeat superior doctrine and concluded
that when the misconduct is of a personal nature and not related to the
business, the employer is not vicariously liable. 4 The majority recited a
number of decisions where the courts rejected the notion of vicarious
liability. 5 The court pointed out that in each of these cases, the
employee's actions were strictly personal in nature and had no relation
to the employee's position with the employer."8 Justice Baxter further
stressed that the actions of the employees did not relate to their re-
sponsibilities to their employers, "nor had they been necessary to the
employees' comfort, convenience, health, or welfare while at work."7
Applying these cases and principles to the instant case, Justice Baxter
first emphasized that neither party disputed that Nelson's comments and
actions were personally motivated and not related to his duties as a sher-
iff.' 8 In addition, Nelson's actions were neither necessary for his work
nor related to his work. 9 The court noted that Nelson violated the
County policy against sexual harassment and the County penalized him
for this violation.20 Justice Baxter reiterated that an employer will not
be held accountable when the employee was not directly or indirectly
serving his employer.2'
The majority flatly rejected Farmer's argument that there were other
decisions that found the employer liable where there were "far more
serious physical injuries caused by misconduct far more egregious and
shocking."' The court distinguished these cases by asserting that "those
14. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1005-06, 906 P.2d at 449-50, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487-88.
See generally Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The
Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. Iu. L REv. 589 (1993)
(arguing that employer liability for sexual harassment should not be analyzed under the
respondeat superior doctrine).
15. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1005-07, 906 P.2d at 449-50, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487-88.
16. Id. at 1007, 906 P.2d at 450, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1007, 906 P.2d at 451, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1007-08, 906 P.2d at 451, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489. See generally 2 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 393 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1994) (defining sexual harassment in the workplace).
21. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1008, 906 P.2d at 451, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489.
22. Id.
decisions involved an assault precipitated by a work-related dis-
pute ....,3
Justice Baxter agreed that sexual harassment in the workplace is a
widespread problem, but declined to give it any probative value because
the question is whether "lewd propositioning and offensive touchings of
coworkers are typical of or broadly incidental to the... county jail."'
The court maintained that it is imperative to demonstrate that "asking
individual employees for sexual favors and targeting those individuals for
inappropriate touching is either typical of or broadly incidental to the
operation of a county jail or to the duties and tasks of deputy sheriffs at
such a jail."" The court rejected Farmer's argument that Nelson's misbe-
havior toward Bates was partly due to the fact that he was her training
officer.26 Reasoning that Nelson harassed Bates prior to the time he was
her supervisor, Justice Baxter went on to cite a number of cases to dem-
onstrate that "employees do not act within the scope of employment
when they abuse job-created authority over others for purely personal
reasons."
27
3. Respondeat Superior Policy Goals
The majority provided an extensive review of the three policy goals of
the respondeat superior doctrine.' Justice Baxter set forth three main
reasons why the first policy goal, "to prevent recurrence of the tortious
conduct," did not persuade the court that Nelson was acting within the
scope of employment.2' First, the State statutorily requires the County
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1009, 906 P.2d at 452, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490. The majority then criticized
Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion for concluding that "lewd propositioning and offensive
touching fall within the scope of employment at a county jail." Id. Justice Baxter
claimed that Justice Mosk's analysis was flawed, because Justice Mosk did not cite any
authority for his approach and ignored the requirement that "the tortious act must
arise out of the employment." Id. at 1010-11, 906 P.2d at 452-53, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
490-91.
25. Id. at 1011, 906 P.2d at 453, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491.
26. Id. at 1011-12, 906 P.2d at 453-54, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491-92. The majority dis-
tinguished the case at hand from Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 814
P.2d 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991), which found the City of Los Angeles vicariously
liable for the rape of a woman committed by a police officer who pulled her over for
a traffic violation. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1012, 906 P.2d at 454, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
492. Justice Baxter declined to equate the "work-related authority" a supervisor has
over an employee with the "extraordinary power and authority" a police officer has
over a citizen. Id.
27. Id. at 1013, 906 P.2d at 454, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492.
28. Id. at 1013-17, 906 P.2d at 455-57, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-95.
29. Id. at 1013-15, 906 P.2d at 454-56, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-94.
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to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace.' Second, vicarious lia-
bility motivates the County to try to eradicate sexual harassment in the
work enviromnent." Third, the "deterrence objectives are better served
by denying sexual harassers the right to indemnity than by insulating
them from financial responsibility for their own misconduct. "3
The court found the second policy justification, "to give greater assur-
ance of compensation to the victim," unconvincing because the deputies
already received compensation from the County.'
The majority also considered the third policy goal of the respondeat
superior doctrine which is to "ensure that the victim's losses will be
equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise
to the injury. The court espoused that Nelson had no authority over
two of the three officers and had no authority over Bates at the time that
he initially harassed her so "the connection between Nelson's duties and
his deliberate targeting of the three women for sexual harassment was
'simply too attenuated' to be deemed as falling within the range of risks
allocable to the community in this case."' Justice Baxter concluded that
30. Id. at 1014-15, 906 P.2d at 455-56, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94.
31. Id. at 1015, 906 P.2d at 456, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1016, 906 P.2d at 456-57, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494-95 (citing Mary M. v.
City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 209, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99, 100
(1991)); see Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1463 (1986) (advocating that "a
plaintiff can rarely rely on traditional tort theories for adequate compensation"). Justice
Baxter also expressed concern over the difficulty the County would have in obtaining
insurance if they were required to indemnify Nelson. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1016, 906
P.2d at 456-57, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494-95; see Larry M. Golub, Insurance Coverage Is-
sues in Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions, in Employment Dis-
crimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts, (A.LI.-A.B.A.
Course of Study, June 17, 1992), available in WESTLAW, C742 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 921, 936-48
(discussing insurance coverage for sexual harassment claims).
34. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1016, 906 P.2d at 457, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495 (citing
Mary M., 54 Cal 3d at 209, 814 P.2d at 1349, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 107). Justice Baxter
again distinguished Mary M., which held that "[t]he cost ... should be borne by the
community, because of the substantial benefits that the community derives from the
lawful exercise of police power." Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1016, 906 P.2d at 457, 47
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495 (quoting Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 217, 814 P.2d at 1349, 285 Cal.
Rptr. at 107 (1991)).
35. Farmers, 11 Cal 4th at 1017, 906 P.2d at 457, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495. See John
R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 452, 769 P.2d 948, 956, 256 Cal. Rptr.
766, 774 (1989) (holding that a school district was not vicariously liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior when a school teacher allegedly sexually molested a stu-
the evaluation of the three policy goals of respondeat superior supported
the majority's conclusion that Nelson was not acting within the scope of
his employment.'
4. The County's Defense of Other Employees
The majority's final analysis considered the court of appeal's determi-
nation that Nelson was acting within the scope of employment because
the County defended other employees in the sexual harassment litiga-
tion.37 Justice Baxter proclaimed that the County's representation of the
other employees was not inconsistent with their refusal to represent
Nelson because these other employees were accused of not properly
doing their job of investigating complaints of sexual hamssment.' Thus,
these employees were clearly acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.'
5. Scope of Employment Question Resolved as a Matter of Law
The court agreed with the parties "that the scope of employment ques-
tion may be resolved as a matter of law."40 Justice Baxter clarified that
determining if the employer's acts are within the scope of employment is
a matter of law when the facts are undisputed.4' In this case, the facts
indicated that Nelson did not act within the scope of his employment;
therefore, the majority concluded Nelson could not obtain indemnifica-
tion and defense costs from the County.42
dent); Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church, 197 Cal. App. 3d 718, 723, 243 Cal. Rptr.
128, 131 (1988) (determining that a church is not vicariously liable for the actions of a
Sunday school teacher).
36. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1017, 906 P.2d at 457, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
37. Id. at 1018-19, 906 P.2d at 458, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Elder v. Rice, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1604, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (1994)
(declaring that the scope of employment issue is usually a question of fact; however, it
becomes a matter of law when the facts are undisputed and there are no possible
inferences).
41. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1019, 906 P.2d at 458-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-97.
42. Id. The majority concluded by assuring that their holding neither "eliminatels]
the incentive for employers to prevent or respond to sexual harassment in the
workplace [n]or... leave[s] sexual harassment victims without adequate means to re-
cover compensation .. . ." Id at 1019-20, 906 P.2d at 459, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497.
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B. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
Even though Justice Baxter wrote the majority opinion, he drafted a
concurring opinion agreeing with Justice George's concurrence that Mary
M. v. City of Los Angeles' should be overruled." However, Justice
Baxter thought that the present case was too distinguishable from Mary
M. to effectively overrule it.45
C. Justice George's Concurring Opinion
Justice George's concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas con-
curred, declared that Mary M. should be overruled.' Justice George
analogized Nelson's acts of sexual harassment to the police officer's act
of rape in Mary M. and determined that both instances were outside the
scope of employment because the perpetrators acted solely for their own
personal satisfaction." Concerned that lower courts would follow the
"special rules" set forth in Mary M., Justice George concluded that by
overruling Mary M. "all cases will be governed by the general rules of
respondeat superior ably set forth and applied in the majority opin-
ion." '
D. Justice Werdegar's Concurring Opinion
Justice Werdegar wrote separately to criticize Justice Mosk's dis-
sent.49 Justice Werdegar maintained that Justice Mosk's view, that sexu-
al harassment in a male-dominated workplace is foreseeable, was incon-
sistent with the true issue of the required duties of the employee.'
Justice Werdegar further criticized Justice Mosk for relying on Carr v.
Wm. C. Crowell Co.,5 because Car-, "rather than supporting Justice
43. 54 Cal. 3d 202, 814 P.2d 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991).
44. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1020, 906 P.2d at 459, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497 (Baxter,
J., concurring).
45. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
46. Id. (George, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 1021-22, 906 P.2d at 460-61, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-99 (George, J., con-
curring). Justice George also insisted that "the rape of a detainee by a police offi-
cer ... is 'so unusual and startling' that it cannot fairly be said to have arisen from
the employment." Id. at 1023, 906 P.2d at 460, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498 (George, J.,
concurring).
48. Id. at 1023, 906 P.2d at 461, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (George, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Werdegar, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1024, 906 P.2d at 462, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
51. 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946) (finding the employer liable when a contractor
Mosk's view, instead highlights the difficulty of articulating a plausible
link between sexual harassment and Deputy Nelson's duties as a deputy
sheriff."2 Justice Werdegar noted that even if sexual harassment does
occur in the workplace, it is not a determinative factor.' Justice
Werdegar concluded by admonishing the dissent for giving too "much
weight to statistical considerations. ""
E. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk's dissent declared that Nelson's conduct was within the
scope of employment.' Justice Mosk maintained that "the best way to
determine whether a risk is inherent in or created by an enterprise is to
ask... whether the employee's conduct was 'so unusual or startling' in
the context of that enterprise that it would be unfair to include the re-
sulting loss in the employer's costs of doing business."56
Justice Mosk focused on the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in
fields traditionally dominated by males. 7 By using case law and testimo-
ny, Justice Mosk illustrated the widespread practice of men sexually
harassing female co-workers in jails and prisons." Justice Mosk con-
cluded that "when women deputy sheriffs were thrust into the tradition-
ally male workplace of the county jail, sexual harassment became a risk
'inherent in or created by the enterprise' and hence within the scope of
employment for respondeat superior purposes.
" 9
Justice Mosk criticized the majority for establishing a rule that con-
siders foreseeability irrelevant in determining liability in the respondeat
superior context.' Justice Mosk contended that Nelson's conduct was
sufficient to invoke respondeat superior liability.6 Thus, the indemnifi-
and subcontractor got into an argument over their job related tasks and one threw a
hammer at the other).
52. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 1024, 906 P.2d at 462, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500
(Werdegar, J., concurring).
53. Id, at 1025, 906 P.2d at 462, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1025, 906 P.2d at 463, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1028, 906 P.2d at 464, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 1029-31, 906 P.2d at 465-67, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503-05 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
58. Id. at 1033, 906 P.2d at 468, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1031-35, 906 P.2d at 467-69, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505-07 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
60. Id. at 1035-36, 906 P.2d at 469-70, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507-08 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
61. Id.
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cation statute was applicable and the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment should have been granted.6
F. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote separately to avow that the County's liability
was a question of fact, and thus should have been determined by the
trier of fact.'
Justice Kennard stressed that the important question for the court to
consider was whether Nelson's conduct was "so unusual or startling as
to fall outside the scope of his employment."6 Disagreeing with the
majority's holding that this question could be resolved as a matter of law,
Justice Kennard advocated that the case should not be resolved, arguing
there is a factual dispute as to whether Nelson was acting within the
scope of employment.' Justice Kennard criticized the majority's use of
cases that employed the "motive" test to demonstrate that Nelson acted
outside the scope of employment because California no longer applies
this test.6
Justice Kennard opposed Justice Mosk's view "that as a matter of law
Deputy Nelson's conduct fell within the scope of his employment." 7
Justice Kennard cited two main reasons for her opposing position.'
First, Justice Kennard rejected Justice Mosk's view that Nelson's conduct
was the result of resentment of women coming into a male-dominated
occupation because Farmers never provided the court with this argu-
ment.' Second, Justice Kennard objected to Justice Mosk's use of sur-
veys and studies, showing that sexual harassment was common in tradi-
62. Id. at 1037, 906 P.2d at 470, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1038, 906 P.2d at 471, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1042, 906 P.2d at 474, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard expressed that the center of the
debate was whether Nelson's conduct was typical behavior in the county jail. Id. at
1043, 906 P.2d at 475, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard
also stated that "whether Nelson was engaged in joking and horseplay is a disputed
issue of fact" Id. at 1045, 906 P.2d at 476, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
66. Id. at 1046, 906 P.2d at 476, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1046, 906 P.2d at 477, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1047, 906 P.2d at 477, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
tionally male dominated professions because they were not a part of the
record before the court.7"
Justice Kennard concluded by stating that "whether an employee's acts
of harassment fall within the scope of employment should be decided on
a case-by-case basis, by closely examining that nature of the conduct and
its relationship to the employer's enterprise."7
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
In Alma W v. Oakland Unified School District,' the court held that
an employer cannot be held vicariously liable when an employee acts for
personal reasons and substantially deviates from his duties to the em-
ployer.' Five years later, in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc.,74 the
California Supreme Court maintained that employer liability extends to
risks inherent in or created by an employer's enterprise.75 The Perez
court also set forth the foreseeability test for vicarious liability when it
stated that "[a] risk arises out of the employment when 'in the context of
the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or
startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it
among other costs of the employer's business .... 
In Farmers, the California Supreme Court narrowed employer liability
by holding that an employee who sexually harasses co-workers will be
unable to receive indemnification from his employer when the
employee's conduct is outside the scope of employment.77 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision is in sharp contrast to the current trend of
holding employers "liable for sexual harassment by employees under the
doctrine of respondeat superior."Ts The court deviated from the current
70. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1048, 906 P.2d at 477, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard would have reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and ordered
the trial court to deny both party's motions for summary judgment. Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
72. 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 176 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1981).
73. Id. at 139, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
74. 41 Cal. 3d 962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986).
75. Id. at 968, 719 P.2d at 680, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
76. Id. (quoting Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 619, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 143, 149 (1975)).
77. Farmers, 11 Cal. 4th at 997, 906 P.2d at 444, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
78. Jana Howard Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, Seual Harassment Litigation: 1995,
New Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment from Meritor to Harris, Karibian
and Steiner, 524 PRAc. L. INsT. 7, 18 (1995).
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trend and provided a deterrence to employees who sexually harass their
co-workers since sexual harassers may not be able to seek indemnity if
their co-workers sue them for their misbehavior.
LORI L. PROUDFIT
B. A hospital will not be vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for an employee's
sexual assault of a patient when the assault was not
engendered by the employment: Lisa M. v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital,' the California
Supreme Court decided whether a hospital could be held vicariously
liable for the intentional misconduct of its employee under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.2 The trial court granted the hospital's motion for
1. 12 Cal. 4th 291, 907 P.2d 358, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (1995). Justice Werdegar
delivered the opinion of the majority, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Ara-
bian, Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 294-306, 907 P.2d at 359-67, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 511-19. Justice George wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas con-
curred. Id. at 306, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519 (George, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 308-14, 907 P.2d at 369-73, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519-24 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissent-
ing opinion. Id. at 306-08, 907 P.2d at 368-69, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524-25 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
2. Id. at 294, 907 P.2d at 359, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511. Plaintiff Lisa M., a pregnant
19 year-old woman, sought treatment at the emergency room of defendant Henry Mayo
Newhall Memorial Hospital after being injured in a fall. Id. at 294, 907 P.2d at 359, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511. At the direction of an emergency room physician, Bruce Wayne
Tripoli took the plaintiff to the ultrasound room for ultrasonic imaging. Id. at 294-95,
907 P.2d at 359, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511. Tripoli, an ultrasound technician, was em-
ployed by Mediq Imaging Services, Inc. and was contracted to perform ultrasound ser-
vices for the hospital. Id. at 296 n.2, 907 P.2d at 360 n.2, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512 n.2.
Alone in the ultrasound room with the plaintiff, Tripoli performed the ordered examina-
tion. Id. at 295, 907 P.2d at 359-60, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511-12. Tripoli had the plaintiff
lift her shirt and pull her shorts down to reveal her pubic region. Id. at 295, 907 P.2d
at 360, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512. Tripoli then rubbed gel into the plaintiff's skin and
used the ultrasound generating wand to take images of the plaintiff's upper and lower
abdominal regions. Id. To properly perform the upper-right-quadrant exam, Tripoli lifted
the plaintiffs right breast Id. Tripoli left the plaintiff to develop the images and re-
turned 10 minutes later. Id. Tripoli asked the plaintiff if she wanted to know her
baby's gender. Id. The plaintiff answered yes, and Tripoli falsely informed her that he
would need to take further ultrasound images of her lower pubic area and that she
would feel discomfort. Id. The plaintiff agreed to the procedure. Id, With the plaintiffs
cooperation, Tripoli pulled the plaintiffs shorts down and scanned her pubic region. Id.
During the procedure, Tripoli inserted the ultrasound wand into the plaintiffs vagina,
fondled the plaintiff with his fingers, and informed the plaintiff that he needed to ex-
cite her to get a better picture of. the baby. Id. When Tripoli ended the molestation,
he returned the plaintiff to the emergency room. Id. The plaintiff, after being released
from the hospital, discussed the incident with her regular obstetrician who informed
her that Tripoli's actions were improper. Id. at 295-96, 907 P.2d at 360, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 512. Tripoli was criminally prosecuted and pleaded no contest to a felony charge
stemming from the molestation. Id. at 296, 907 P.2d at 360, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512.
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summary judgment.' The court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling,
relying on the theory of vicarious liability.4 The California Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and held that the hospital
was not vicariously liable.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by reviewing the law pertaining to the
doctrine of respondeat superior The court noted that under the doc-
trine an employer can be vicariously liable for an employee's
wrongdoings committed within the scope of employment.7 Noting the
reaches of the doctrine, the court stated that an employee's intentional
and malicious actions may be within the scope of employment even if
the employer never authorized such activity.' However, the court ac-
knowledged that an action will fall within the scope of employment, and
an employer will be vicariously liable, when there is a causal connection
between the employee's work and the commission of the tort.' The
The plaintiff sued Tripoli and Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital for professional
negligence, battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional harm. Id. The
hospital filed a motion for sununmary judgment. Id. Although Tripoli was contracted by
the hospital and was an employee of Mediq, the hospital was considered to be
Tripoli's employer for purposes of summary judgment Id. at 296 n.2, 907 P.2d at 360
n.2, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512 n.2. Otherwise, Tripoli's status as an employee or indepen-
dent contractor was neither considered nor decided.
3. Id. at 294, 907 P.2d at 359, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511.
4. Id. at 296, 907 P.2d at 360, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The court of appeal did not
address the issue of whether the hospital was directly negligent. Id
5. Id. at 306, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
6. Id. at 296-99, 907 P.2d at 360-63, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-15. For a discussion of
how an innocent employer can be held vicariously liable for the torts of his or her
employee, see generally 29 CAL JuR. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 91-100 (1986 &
Supp. 1996). See generally 2 B.E. WmN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORmA LAW, Agency and
Employment § 115 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994).
7. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 296, 907 P.2d at 360, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512. See gener-
ally 29 CAL. Ju. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 107-117 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (discuss-
ing whether an employee's actions will fall within the scope of his or her employ-
ment).
8. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th. at 296-97, 907 P.2d at 360-61, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-13. -It
is a fundamental rule that an act need not be authorized to be within the scope of the
employment." 29 CA]. JuR. 3D Employer and Employee § 107 (1986).
9. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 297, 907 P.2d at 361, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513 ("While the
employee thus need not have intended to further the employer's interests, the employer
court defined causal connection by distinguishing it from "but for' causa-
tion. ° A finding of causation under the "but for" test is insufficient to
constitute the causal connection necessary to make an employer liable
for the actions of his or her employee." The court pronounced that to
be sufficient, the risk of the tort occurring must be an inherent part of
the employment environment." Addressing the issue of sexual assaults,
the court stated that the causal connection requirement will be met when
the emotions motivating the sexual assault are fairly attributable to a
work-related condition or event. 3 Thus, before an employer will be held
vicariously liable, the commission of the tort must be a foreseeable risk
arising from the employer's business. 4
In determining whether Tripoli's sexual assault was within the scope
of his employment, the court noted that the tort was causally connected
to Tripoli's employment in the sense that the assault never would have
occurred if Tripoli had not been employed by the hospital. 5 However,
the court also noted that for respondeat superior to be properly applied,
the risk of the intentional tort's occurrence must have been both an in-
herent part of the employment and foreseeable."6 Because the court
found that Tripoli's desire to assault Lisa M. sexually did not arise from
workplace responsibilities or conditions, but instead arose from his own
lust, the court held that the causal connection requirement was not
met.'7 Additionally, the court found that Tripoli's actions were not a
will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort that did not have a caus-
al nexus to the employee's work."). For a review of judicial interpretations of scope,
see Christine W. Young, Comment, Respondeat Superior: A Clar~ifcation and
Broadening of the Current "Scope of Employment" Test, 30 SANrA CLARA L REV. 599,
611-24 (1990).
10. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 298, 907 P.2d at 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514.
11. Id. ("That the employment brought tortfeasor and victim together in time and
place is not enough.").
12. Id. (citing Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 657, 171 P.2d 5, 7-8
(1946)). Causal nexus requires that "the tort be engendered by or arise from the
work." Id. at 298, 907 P.2d at 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514.
13. Id. at 301, 907 P.2d at 364, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516. For a discussion of when
willful, malicious, or criminal acts will be regarded as falling within the scope of em-
ployment, see 29 CAL Jun. 3D Employer and Employee § 116 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
14. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 299, 907 P.2d at 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514 ("The em-
ployment, in other words, must be such as predictably to create the risk employees
will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.").
15. Id. at 299, 907 P.2d at 363, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
16. Id. at 300, 907 P.2d at 363, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
17. Id. at 301-02, 907 P.2d at 364, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516; see id. at 303, 907 P.2d
at 365, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517 ("The assault, rather, was the independent product of
Tripoli's aberrant decision to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties.").
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generally foreseeable consequence of his employment, and thus, the
hospital could not be held vicariously liable for Tripoli's tort.8
The court also acknowledged the three policy goals of respondeat
superior but found them wanting in this instance. 9 The first two policy
goals, preventing future injuries and assuring compensation to the victim,
gave no clear guidance on the issue of whether respondeat superior
should be applied to the hospital.' The third policy rationale, spreading
the risk of loss among the beneficiaries of the enterprise, also proved
non-dispositive.2" The court concluded that the attenuated link between
Tripoli's actions and his employment duties did not support a finding
that the hospital should bear part of the cost of the patient's injury.2
Public policy considerations, therefore, failed to warrant a finding that
the hospital be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.'
B. Justice George's Concurring Opinion
Justice George, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the majority's
holding,24 but he intimated that the majority's definition of an
18. Id. at 302, 907 P.2d at 364-65, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516-17.
19. Id. at 304-05, 907 P.2d at 366-67, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518-19. For a theoretical
basis of respondeat superior, see 2 B.E. W'mIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency
and Employment § 115 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995).
20. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 304-05, 907 P.2d at 366-67, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518-19
("Although imposition of vicarious liability would likely lead to adoption of some fur-
ther precautionary measures, we are unable to say whether the overall impact would
be beneficial to or destructive of the quality of medical care.... The second policy
consideration is ... also of uncertain import here; imposing vicarious liability is likely
to provide additional compensation to some victims, but the consequential costs of
ensuring compensation in this manner are unclear.").
21. Id. at 305, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
22. Id.
23. Id. For a discussion of respondeat superior in the context of hospital employee
negligence, see Carmen D. Rasmussen, Comment, Hospital Liability Related to
Understaffing of Nursing Services: Walking the Fine Line Between Respondeat Supe-
rior and Corporate Negligence, 94 W. VA. L REV. 1083, 1091-95 (1992). See generally
Lynn D. Lisk, A Physician's Respondeat Superior Liability for the Negligent Acts of
Other Medical Professionals-When the Captain Goes Down Without the Ship, 13 U.
ARK. LrrrLE ROCK LJ. 183 (1991) (arguing that Arkansas should apply the "actual con-
trol" test to doctors in determining liability under respondeat superior).
24. Lisa M., 12 Cal 4th at 306, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519 (George, J.,
concurring).
employee's scope of employment should be construed more narrowly.25
Justice George referenced his concurring opinion in Farmers Insurance
Group v. County of Santa Clara.2" In that opinion, Justice George stat-
ed that the court's holding in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles" was an
aberration and therefore should have been overruled.2
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard contended that the trial
court improperly granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment
because the issue of scope of employment was a question of fact to be
resolved by the trier of fact. 9 Justice Kennard noted that a motion for
summary judgment may be properly granted whenever there is no triable
issue of a material fact.3 Because the issue of whether Tripoli's actions
arose within the scope of his employment was a disputed question, Jus-
tice Kennard stated that summary judgment could not be properly grant-
ed." Therefore, Justice Kennard concluded that the trial court erred in
granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment.'
D. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk espoused his belief that the majority erred in affirming
the trial court's decision to grant the hospital's motion for summary judg-
ment. 3 Justice Mosk also stated that the issue of whether the sexual
assault was causally connected to the scope of employment was a ques-
25. Id. (George, J., concurring).
26. Id. (citing Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1020-23,
906 P.2d 440, 459-61, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478, 497-99 (1995) (George, J., concurring)).
27. 54 Cal. 3d 202, 814 P.2d 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991). In Mary M., the court
found that a police officer's rape of a detainee was within the police officer's scope of
employment and held that the officer's employer was vicariously liable. Id. at 221, 814
P.2d at 1352, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 110. The court maintained that the rape "arose from
misuse of official authority." Id. For a further discussion of Mary M. v. City of Los
Angeles, see Christopher E. Krueger, Note, Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles: Should a
City Be Held Liable Under Respondeat Superior for a Rape by a Police Officer?, 28
U.S.F. L REv. 419 (1994).
28. Farmers Ins., 11 Cal. 4th at 1020-23, 906 P.2d at 459-61, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-
99 (George, J., concurring) (stating that the court's holding in Mary M. should be over-
ruled in order to prevent its misapplication).
29. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 308-14, 907 P.2d at 369, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 311, 907 P.2d at 370-71, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 311, 907 P.2d at 371, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 314, 907 P.2d at 373, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 306-08, 907 P.2d at 368-69, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519-20 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
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tion of fact.' Noting the possibility that Tripoli's desire to sexually as-
sault the patient arose within the scope of his employment, Justice Mosk
stated that the hospital's motion for summary judgment should have
been denied.5 Therefore, Justice Mosk agreed with the court of appeal's
decision that the trial court erred in granting the hospital's motion for
summary judgment.'
Ill. IMPACT
The court analogized this case to other intentional tort cases and ren-
der the decision that hospitals will not be held vicariously liable for in-
tentional sexual assaults committed by employees not acting within the
scope of their employment." Although the court declined to adopt the
conclusion that sexual misconduct in the workplace is per se outside the
scope of employment,' the court seemed to limit the possibility of em-
ployers ever being vicariously liable for the sexual torts of their employ-
ees.
Distinguishing Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, the court stated that
the abuse of job-created authority test was inapplicable to the present
case.' Reasoning that Tripoli had limited authority and control over the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff was expected to put only limited trust in
Tripoli, the court concluded that the misuse of these connections with
the plaintiff was insufficient to find that Tripoli's actions fell within the
scope of his employment." In so doing, the court limited the possibility
that respondeat superior could ever be based on an employee's working
relationship with a patient.4
34. Id. at 307-08, 907 P.2d at 368-69, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
35. Id at 308, 907 P.2d at 368, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 (Mosk, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of when sexual relationships are considered to arise within the scope of
employment, see generally Linda M. Jorgenson, et al., Transference of Liability: Em-
ployer Liability for Sexual Misconduct by Therapists, 60 BROOK. L REV. 1421 (1995).
36. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 308, 907 P.2d at 369, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
37. Id. at 296-99, 907 P.2d at 360-63, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-15.
38. Id. at 300, 907 P.2d at 363, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515 ("We are not persuaded that
the roots of sexual violence and exploitation are in all cases so fundamentally different
from those other abhorrent human traits as to allow a conclusion sexual misconduct is
per se unforeseeable in the workplace.").
39. Id. at 303-04, 907 P.2d at 365-66, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517-18.
40. Id. at 304, 907 P.2d at 366, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
41. See id.
This limitation is further seen in the court's express desire not to hold
medical care providers strictly liable for the deliberate sexual acts of
employees who are required to engage in physical contact with pa-
tients.42 The court concluded that, in these types of cases, although the
employee's job may require contact with a patient's private areas, any
sexually assaultive contact with the patient is not a result of the employ-
ment environment, but rather, a result of the employee's lust.' Because
the court concluded that such an assault derived from the employee's
lust, the court foreclosed the possibility that a deliberate sexual assault
could ever be attributed to the nature of employment.4
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held that a hospital is not vicariously
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for an. intentional tort
committed by its employee when the employee was not acting within the
scope of his employment.4" The court reasoned that respondeat superior
will render an employer liable when there is a causal connection be-
tween the misconduct and the employment and when the employment
environment poses a foreseeable risk that the tort will occur.4' Because
Tripoli's sexual assault was not causally connected to his duties and
responsibilities, and because the risk of an employee sexually assaulting
42. See id. at 306, 907 P.2d at 364-65, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516-17. Some commenta-
tors have argued that employers should be held strictly liable for their employee's
intentional sexual assaults. See generally Adam A. Milani, Patient Assaults: Health Care
Providers Owe a Non-Delegable Duty to Their Patients and Should be Held Strictly
Liable for Employee Assaults Whether or Not Within the Scope of Employment, 21
Orno N.U. L REV. 1147 (1995) (stating that hospitals should be held strictly liable for
the intentional sexual torts of its employees); Shana L Malinowsld, Note, A Matter of
Trust: Imposing Employer Vicarious Liability for the Intentional Torts of Employees,
3 D.C. L REv. 167 (1995) (giving justification for expanding employer liability to cover
intentional sexual torts of employees).
43. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 302, 907 P.2d at 365, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.
44. See id. at 302-03, 907 P.2d at 365, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 517. The court expressly de-
clined to decide whether a physician's emotional or sexual involvement with a willing
patient may create vicarious liability on the physician's employer. Id. at 303 n.7, 907
P.2d at 365 n.7, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517 n.7. For a discussion of when employers can
be vicariously liable for sexual assaults against their patients, see Jorgenson et al.,
supra note 35.
45. Id, at 306, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
46. Id. at 298-99, 907 P.2d at 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514.
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a patient was not foreseeable, the court held that respondeat superior
did not apply and that the hospital was not vicariously liable for the
employee's intentional tort.47
ROLAND T. KELLY
47. Id. at 306, 907 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
VI. IMMUNI
When a government employee driving a motor vehicle
negligently, injures or kills a person while acting within
the scope of his employment, California Government
Code section 845.8 does not protect public entities from
the liabilities imposed by Vehicle Code section 17001:
Thomas v. City of Richmond.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Thomas v. City of Richmond,' the California Supreme Court dis-
cussed whether public entities are liable for injuries inflicted by police
officers who negligently operate motor vehicles while acting within the
scope of their employment.2 The court held that the immunities granted
to public entities by California Government Code section 845.8' are sub-
ject to the liabilities imposed upon public entities by Vehicle Code sec-
tion 170014 for injuries caused as a result of a public employee's negli-
1. 9 Cal. 4th 1154, 892 P.2d 1185, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (1995). Justice Arabian de-
livered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard and
Werdegar concurred. Id, at 1156-65, 892 P.2d at 1185-92, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442-49. In
addition, Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Baxter joined. Id.
at 1165-69, 892 P.2d at 1192-94, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-51 (Mosk, J., concurring). Jus-
tice George alone dissented. Id. at 1169-77, 892 P.2d at 1194-99, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
449-56 (George, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1154-65, 892 P.2d at 1185-92, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442-449. On September 4,
1990, Richmond police officers reacted to a report that there were two armed men
standing at the comer of Sixth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. Id. at 1156, 892 P.2d
at 1185-86, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. When the two men at the comer, the plaintiff Pele
Thomas and a friend, noticed the officers approaching, they ran despite being ordered
to "stop" by the officers. Id. at 1156, 892 P.2d at 1185, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. The
chase of Thomas by the officers ended violently when Thomas was struck by the pur-
suing officer's car, leaving him a quadriplegic and planting the roots for the eventual
lawsuit Id.
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1995). Section 845.8 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code provides that "neither a public entity nor a public employee is
liable for.., any injury caused by: an escaping or escaped prisoner, an escaping or
escaped arrested person; or a person resisting arrest." Id. The court explained that
even though the statute spoke of an escaping person, prisoner, or person resisting ar-
rest, it also applies to situations where a person is only detained or where there has
been an attempt to detain a person, such as in the present case. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th
at 1158, 892 P.2d at 1187, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444; see Kisbey v. California, 36 Cal. 3d
415, 418-19, 682 P.2d 1093, 1095-96, 204 Cal. Rptr. 428, 430-31 (1984) (holding that the
intent of the legislature was not to form a statute with strict technical language that
would allow certain events to slip through the "cracks" of immunity granted to public
entities within the statute).
4. California Vehicle Code § 17001 provides: "A public entity is liable for death or
injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or
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gent operation of a motor vehicle.' The court grounded its decision on
the basis that the legislature had implicitly upheld this interpretation by
not expressly overruling "in-total"6 previous appellate court decisions
interpreting the statutes in the same manner.7
II. TREATMENT
A. Justice Arabian's Majority Opinion
1. The immunities granted by section 845.8 are subject to the
liabilities imposed in section 17001 because the legislature did
not overrule this judicial interpretation.
Justice Arabian provided a short background of the two statutes in
question before proceeding to the crux of his argument.8 He began by
omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity
acting within the scope of his employment" CAL VEH. CODE § 17001 (Deering 1984 &
Supp. 1995).
5. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1159-65, 892 P.2d at 1187-92, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444-49.
6. Id. at 1162-63, 892 P.2d at 1189-90, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47; see ijfra notes
19-24 and accompanying text.
7. Thomas, 9 Cal at 1162-63, 892 P.2d at 1189-90, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47. De-
spite the current trend at the appellate level in interpreting the liabilities under Vehicle
Code § 17001 to preempt the immunities granted in Government Code § 845.8, the su-
perior court granted summary judgment in favor of Richmond holding that the city was
not liable for Thomas' injuries because of the immunities granted in § 845.8. Id. at
1156, 892 P.2d at 1186, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443. The court of appeal reversed the supe-
rior court by following the trend employed at the appellate level, finding that indeed
the immunities given in § 845.8 were subject to the liabilities imposed by § 17001. Id.
8. Id. at 1157-59, 892 P.2d at 1186-87, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-44. Justice Arabian
reiterated the basic rule governing public entity immunity in California provided in
Government Code § 815. Id. at 1157, 829 P.2d at 1186, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
Section 815 states in relevant part- "Except as otherwise provided by statute, [a]
public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or
omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." CAL GOV'T
CODE § 815 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1995). See generally James V. Arnold, Governmental
Liability for Torts of Employees-The End of Sovereign Immunity in California, 5
SANTA CLARA L REv. 81 (1964) (discussing general and discretionary immunity). While
Government Code § 815 sets forth the general rules for liability, other statutory
sources, such as Vehicle Code § 17001, can impose liability. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at
1157-59, 892 P.2d at 118&-87, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-44 (citing Duarte v. San Jose, 100
Cal. App. 3d 648, 161 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1980)).
The court noted that it previously held that § 815 was subject to the liabilities
under § 17001. Id. at 1158, 892 P.2d at 1186-87, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-44; see
Brummett v. Sacramento, 21 Cal. 3d 880, 582 P.2d at 952, 148 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1978);
stating that the language of the two statutes did not "expressly state how
each affects the other."9 Because the court had not previously consid-
ered this issue,"0 the majority examined the appellate courts' decisions
interpreting the two statutes." Since 1980, the court of appeal held on
three separate occasions 2 that public entities are liable for injuries in-
flicted upon innocent third parties by suspects fleeing police officers
under the liabilities imposed by Vehicle Code section 17001,"3 despite
the immunities granted to these same entities under Government Code
section 845.8.1
4
see also 35 CAL. Jup. 3D Government Tort Liability §§ 7, 43 (1979 & Supp. 1995) (dis-
cussing governmental tort liability in automobile accidents); 5 B.E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF
CAuFORmA LAw, Governmental Tort Liability §§ 129, 229 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing the adoption of the Tort Claims Act and negligent operation of a vehicle).
Thus, the city of Richmond did not claim that § 815 granted it immunity, but rather
argued § 845.8 must be interpreted differently to protect against the liabilities imposed
by § 17001. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1157-59, 892 P.2d at 1186-87, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
443-44.
9. Id. at 1159, 892 P.2d at 1187, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
10. Id. at 1157-59, 892 P.2d at 1186-87, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-44. The court had
previously ruled that § 815.2 was subject to the liabilities imposed by § 17001. Id. For
an indepth look into the liability of local governments under certain federal statutes,
see Karen M. Blum, Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 511 SUFFOLK U.
L Rsv. 329 (1994).
11. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1157-60, 892 P.2d at 1186-88, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-45.
12. Id. In each of the cases an innocent third party was injured by an escaping sus-
pect Id. In each. instance the court of appeals held the public entity liable under
§ 17001 despite the protections granted under § 845.8. Id.; see Duarte, 100 Cal. App.
3d 648, 161 Cal. Rptr. 140; Stark v. Los Angeles, 168 Cal. App. 3d 276, 214 Cal. Rptr.
216 (1985); San Jose v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 695, 212 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985). For a broader discussion, see 5 B.E. WITEN, SUMMARY OF CALUFORNIA LAW,
Torts §§ 198-201 (9th ed. & Supp. 1992); 57 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal, County, School
and State Tort Liability §§ 458-462, 474-478 (1988 & Supp. 1995); 52 CAL. JuR. 3D
Public Officers and Employees §§ 230, 234 (1979 & Supp. 1995); Ronald J. Bacigal, The
Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 Ky. LJ. 145, 156-63 (1994); Jeffery M. Epstein,
Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights for Injuries Sustained During Police Pur-
suits, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 356 (1994); Robert L Hughes, Liability of State to Mem-
bers of Public Harmed by Convicts During Escapes Occasioned by Negligence of State
Agents, 7 HASTINGS LJ. 330 (1956). 1
13. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th 1157-60, 892 P.2d at 1186-88, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-45.
14. Id. at 1157-60, 892 P.2d at 1186-88, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-45.
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2. The effect of the general rule provided in Government Code
section 815 conflicts with liabilities imposed by other statutes.
The city of Richmond argued that the language within section 815
proposed a general rule that immunities will prevail over liabilities in
situations of conflicting statutes."5 In addition, the city cited the legisla-
tive history of the section, which stated that when statutes do not adhere
to this general rule the legislature will make this evident. The city also
cited three statutes which imposed the liabilities of Vehicle Code section
17001 over the immunities given to public entities. 7 Thus, Richmond
argued that because Government Code section 845.8 was not expressly
subject to Vehicle Code section 17001, it followed that the immunities of
section 845.8 should prevail over the liabilities in section 17001.0.18 Jus-
tice Arabian conceded that while this argument might logically apply, the
legislature's actions in 1987 undermined this argument.9
3. Defining the effect of the legislature's enactment of Vehicle Code
section 17004.7.
Justice Arabian continued by stating that the passage of section
17004.7,2° which grants immunity to public entities for injuries caused
by fleeing suspects in motor vehicles if a specified written policy was
15. Id. at 1160, 892 P.2d at 1188, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1160-62, 892 P.2d at 1188-90, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-47. Richmond cited
three statutes that expressly yielded to the liabilities under § 17001: (1) Government
Code § 844.6(b) states that "nothing in this section affects the liability of a public
entity under [Vehicle Code §§ 17000-17004.7]"; (2) section 850.4 provides immunity "ex-
cept as provided in [Vehicle Code § 17000]"; and (3) section 854.8(b) contains the
same language as 844.6. Id. For a closer look at governmental liability due to car acci-
dents, see 5 B.E. WITaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 226 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1995), 35 CAL. Jun. 3D Government Tort Liability § 7 (1988 & Supp. 1995), 57
Am. JUn. 2D Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability §§ 236-239 (1988 &
Supp. 1995), and 83 A.LR. 2D 452 (1962).
18. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1160-61, 892 P.2d at 1188-89, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-46.
19. Id. at 1160-61, 892 P.2d at 1189-90, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-46.
20. Vehicle Code § 17004.7(b) provides in relevant parL "A public agency employing
peace officers which adopts a written policy on vehicular pursuits complying with
subdivision (c) is immune from liability for civil damages [that occur as a consequence
of a collision caused by a suspect fleeing the police]." CAL VEH. CODE § 17004.7(b)
(West Supp. 1996). See generally 5 B.E. WrrMN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§§ 226-232 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing governmental liability in the opera-
tion of motor vehicles).
adopted, was a direct reaction to previous decisions holding public enti-
ties liable under section 17001.21 Justice Arabian noted that section
17004.7 provides immunity only if the entity adopted a specified written
policy.' Therefore, the legislature "impliedly approved" the previous
lower courts' judgments by making immunity contingent on the adoption
of a specified written policy, instead of expressly overruling those deci-
sions.' Thus, the court explained that it was bound by the previous in-
terpretations of how section 17001 affected section 845.8 and could not
overrule the legislative action.2
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's
contention that Government Code section 845.8 applied to the present
case.25 He further argued that the words "caused by" used in section
845.8 contain the solution to the court's conflicting views." He
maintained that section 845.8 only granted immunity to public entities in
the event the an injury was "caused by" an escaping suspect.27 There-
fore, because in the present case the injury was "caused to" the suspect
by the police the immunities of Government Code section 845.8 did not
apply. Instead, Justice Mosk argued that the liabilities imposed by Vehi-
cle Code section 17001 for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
should apply.-
21. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1161-62, 892 P.2d at 1189-90, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47;
see supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 1162, 892 P.2d at 1189, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
23. Id. at 1162, 892 P. 2d. at 1189-90, Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 446-47.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1166-69, 892 P.2d at 1192-94, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-51 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
26. Id. at 1166, 892 P.2d. at 1192, 40 Cal. Rptr 2d at 449 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Mosk believed that the legislature understood the distinction between "caused
by" and "caused to." Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). He argued this because in other stat-
utes, such as Government Code § 856.2, the legislature had purposely included the
words "caused to" in order to grant immunity to public entities for any injuries actu-
ally "caused to" an escaping mental patient Id. at 1167-68, 892 P.2d. at 1193, 40 Cal.
Rptr 2d at 450 (Mosk, J., concurring). Additionally, he contended the legislature in
§ 856.2 had also granted immunity to a public entity for any injuries "caused by" an
escaping patient because the statute included these specific words. Id. (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
27. Id. at 1168-69, 892 P.2d. at 1193-94, 40 Cal. Rptr 2d at 450-51 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
28. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
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C. Justice George's Dissenting Opinion
Justice George stated that the foundational case of Duarte v. San
Jose,' which was relied on by the majority, is flawed because it incor-
rectly holds that the immunities in Government Code section 845.8 are
subject to the liabilities imposed by Vehicle section 17001.' He also ar-
gued that, contrary to the views of the majority, the legislature's enact-
ment of section 17004.7 had not "impliedly approved" the holding in
Duarte and its prodigy, and therefore the court was not bound to accept
their erroneous reasoning.3' Justice George recognized, as did Justice
Mosk, that Government Code section 845.8 granted immunity to public
entities for all injuries "caused by" a fleeing suspect.2 Unlike Justice
Mosk, however, Justice George left open the question whether the
plaintiffs injuries in the present case were "caused by" himself because
he had fled, or if they were "caused to" him by the officer driving neg-
ligently.' In Justice George's opinion, the determination of who caused
the injury should have controlled whether to apply section 845.8 or sec-
tion 17001 to the present case.'
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Thomas clarifies the interplay between two statutes, one which grants
immunities to public entities under the California Tort Claims Act,' and
the other which imposes liabilities for the negligent operation of motor
29. 100 Cal. App. 3d 648, 161 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1980).
30. Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1169-77, 892 P.2d at 1194-99, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-56
(George, J., dissenting). No other Justices joined in Justice George's dissent Id.
(George, J., dissenting). Among other flaws, he pointed out that § 845.8 did not contain
any express language subjecting it to the liabilities imposed by § 17001, although other
statutes did. Id. at 1171, 892 P.2d at 1195-96, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-53 (George, J.,
dissenting).
31. Id. at 1171-72, 892 P.2d at 1196, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453 (George, J., dissenting).
Justice George's most compelling argument was the timing aspect of the enactment of
§ 17004.7. Id. at 1172, 892 P.2d at 1196, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453 (George, J., dissent-
ing). The legislature passed the statute nearly seven years after the holding in Duarte,
thus it seems unlikely that it was passed in response to the holding. Id. at 1172-73,
892 P.2d at 1196-97, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-54 (George, J., dissenting).
32. Id. (George, J., dissenting); see supra, notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 1174-76, 892 P.2d at 1198-99, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-56 (George, J., dis-
senting); see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
34. Id. (George, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1157, 892 P.2d at 1186, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443. The California Tort Claims
Act grants immunity to public entities in various situations. Id.
vehicles under Vehicle Code section 17001 by employees of a public
entity.' It is now apparent that in certain factual scenarios, public enti-
ties are liable under section 17001 despite the immunities granted by var-
ious California Government Code 800 sections.37 Liability will therefore
attach whether or not the legislature has expressly stated this within the
statute.8 In the future, public entities can now expect to be held liable
for any injuries caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles, un-
less the legislature sees fit to authorize new policy.
WILLIAM ANTHONY BAIRD
36. Id
37. Id. at 1157-65, 892 P.2d at 1186-92, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-49.
38. Id. at 1157-62, 892 P.2d at 1186-90, 40 CaL Rptr. 2d at 443-47.
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VII. INSURANCE
Insurance policies obtained by highway carriers pursu-
ant to state regulations remain in effect until the Public
Utilities Commission receives notice of cancellation;
however, insurance companies are entitled to reimburse-
ment for certain payments made pursuant to the regula-
tions administered by the Public Utilities Commission:
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Tab Transportation, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Tab Transportation, Inc.,' the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court considered whether insurance companies, under
policies issued to highway carriers (carriers),2 remained liable for these
polices until the Public Utilities Commission (PUC)3 received notice of
cancellation, or alternatively, if liability expired pursuant to the terms
contained within the policies.4 Contrary to the finding of the court of
1. 12 Cal. 4th 389, 906 P.2d 1341, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159 (1996). Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Mosk, George and Werdegar concurred.
Id. at 393-404, 906 P.2d at 1342-49, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-67. In addition, Justice Ara-
bian filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 404-05, 906 P.2d at 1349-50, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
167-68 (Arabian, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter also filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian concurred. Id, at 405-14, 906 P.2d at 1350-56,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168-73 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
2. Id, at 393-404, 906 P.2d at 1342-49, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-67. The statute de-
fines highway carriers as motor vehicles used in the "transportation of property for
compensation." See CAL. PUB. UTm. CODE § 3511 (Deering 1990 & Supp. 1996) (giving
the statutory definition of highway carriers and exceptions); see also 37 CAL Ju. 3D
Highway Freight Transport § 10 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (explaining what generally can
be classified as common carriers); 14 A&L JuR. 2D Carriers § 2 (1964 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing common carriers); Boris H. Lakusta, Regulation of Truckers For Hire in
California, 41 CAL L REV. 63 (1953) (exploring the regulation of truckers in Califor-
nia). Highway carriers licensed in California are subject to regulations administered by
the Public Utilities Commission. See 53 CAL Jun. 3D Public Utilities § 12 (1979 &
Supp. 1995) (describing the function of the commission). One of these regulations re-
quires that the carriers submit proof that they possess adequate insurance.
Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 397, 906 P.2d at 1343, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
3. For a more detailed discussion of the duties of the Public Utilities Commission
see 53 CAL Jun. 3D Public Utilities §§ 12-31 (1979 & Supp. 1995) (relating the struc-
ture, jurisdiction and powers of the public utilities commission). See also 8 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 889 (1988 & Supp. 1995)
(detailing the duties of the PUC).
4. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 393-97, 906 P.2d at 1342-46, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
appeal,5 the supreme court held that the insurance policies in controver-
sy did not expire pursuant to their own terms, but only written notice to
the PUC could cancel the policies.' Moreover, the court held that insur-
ance companies were entitled to reimbursement for any amounts which
would not have been paid but for the regulations administered by the
PUC.
7
H. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Insurance providers remain liable for policies issued to highway
carriers until the policies are cancelled by written notice to the
Public Utilities Commission.
Justice Kennard began the majority opinion by discussing the regulato-
ry history of the Highway Carriers' Act of 1935.' She explained that the
legislature promulgated the act to protect the public from highway car-
160-63. In 1980, Tab, a commercial trucking company, purchased liability insurance
from Transamerica in compliance with the Highway Carriers' Act Id. at 395, 906 P.2d
at 1343, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161. The policy provided for coverage from February 1,
1980 to February 1, 1981. Id. Prior to February 1, 1981, Tab bought another insurance
policy. Id. at 395, 906 P.2d at 1343-44, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161. Neither Tab nor
Transamerica sent a notice of cancellation to the PUC as the PUC endorsement form
attached to the policy required. Id. at 395, 906 P.2d at 1344, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161.
In 1989, a truck owned by Tab collided with an Amtrak passenger train, injuring
numerous passengers and killing the truck driver. Id. at 395, 906 P.2d at 1344, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 162. As a result of the accident, the victims sued Tab for millions of dol-
lars. Id. at 396, 906 P.2d at 1344, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162. In turn, Tab sought coverage
under its insurance policies for the settlements which eventually resulted. Id. In 1992
Transamerica sought declaratory judgment to be relieved of any liability resulting from
the accident and in the alternative to be entitled to reimbursement for "any payments
made under the policy." Id. Tab counter-claimed, contending coverage existed under
the policy. Id. The superior court granted summary judgment for Tab, but commenced
with trial to determine the issue of reimbursement. Id. The court held in favor of
Transamerica. Id. Subsequently, each party appealed to the appellate court. Id.
5. Id. at 39-97, 906 P.2d at 1344-45, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162. The court of appeal
reversed on the issue of coverage, determining that the policy issued had expired by
its own terms on February 1, 1981; accordingly, Tab did not have the obligation to
cancel the policy by sending notice to the PUC. Id. Therefore, Transamerica's possible
liability ceased when the policy expired. Id.
6. Id. at 404, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
7. Id. at 403-04, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167. The court of appeal did
not address the issue of reimbursement due to its holding that Transamerica's coverage
had expired in 1981. Id. at 397, 906 P.2d at 1344, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
8. Id. at 397, 906 P.2d at 1345, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63; see CAL PUB. UMnL CODE
§ 3501 (Deering 1990 & Supp. 1996). See generally Arlo D. Poe, Regulation of High-
way Carriers in California, 30 S. CAL L REv. 131 (1957) (explaining California's com-
mon carriers regulatory system).
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riers with inadequate insurance.9 Thus, to fulfill the purposes of the act,
all policies issued to highway carriers must now contain a standard PUC
endorsement form, incorporating certain regulatory provisions into the
issued policies." Additionally, all highway carriers must file proof of the
insurance agreement" with the PUC. 2
a. Insurance polices provided to highway carriers cannot expire but
can only be cancelled.
After examining the history behind the regulations, the court explained
that the purpose of a statute requiring insurance is to ensure that the
insurance policy will include the provisions of the statute within the
policy itself.3 Accordingly, any policy conditions in disagreement with
the state statute become nullified. 4 Based on prior holdings, 5 the
9. Trnsamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 397-98, 906 P.2d at 1345-46, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
162-63; see Keller v. Thorton Canning Co., 66 Cal. 2d 963, 429 P.2d 156, 59 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1967) (naming inadequate insurance as a paramount concern of the Highway
Carriers' Act); see also 8 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law
§ 907 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (relating to information about state regulatory powers).
10. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 398, 906 P.2d at 1345, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162. The
relevant provisions in this case come from PUC General Order No. 100-I, which pro-
vides that an insurance policy can not be cancelled on less than 30 days notice and
that all policies under the Carriers' Act would remain in full force until they are can-
celled in the manner provided in PUC General Order No. 100-1. Id.
11. Id. A carrier also has the option of purchasing a surety bond instead of an in-
surance policy. Id. at 398; see CAL PUB. U~m. CODE §§ 3633, 3634 (Deering 1990 &
Supp. 1996) (explaining the options of carriers).
12. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 397-98, 906 P.2d at 1345, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
The certificate of insurance filed with the PUC states in pertinent part that all the
provisions of the standard endorsement form apply to the issued policies. Id See
generally 8 B.E. WXmIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 896 (1988
& Supp. 1995) (describing how the PUC regulates common carriers).
13. Transamerica, 12 CaL 4th at 398, 906 P.2d at 1345-46, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-
63. 'The obligations of such a policy are measured and defined by the pertinent stat-
ute, and the two together form the insurance contract."' Id. at 398, 906 P.2d at 1346,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163 (quoting Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 231,
636 P.2d 32, 39, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 350 (quoting 6c JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4463 at 615-17 (Richard B. Buckley, ed.
1979))).
14. Id. at 399, 906 P.2d at 1346, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64. The court explained this
is especially true in the case ."'where the policy itself expressly so provides [for a
conflict with state law]."'" Id. at 399, 906 P.2d at 1346, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164 (quoting
Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 231, 636 P.2d 32, 39, 178 Cal. Rptr.
343, 350 (quoting 6c JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 4463 at 615-17 (Richard B. Buckley, ed. 1979))).
15. Id. The majority drew most of its reasoning from Samson v. Transamerica Ins.
court further stated that the contract between Transamerica and Tab
must be read as having incorporated all relevant statutory provisions. 6
Again, the effect of the incorporation effectively nullified any provisions
in the policy that conflicted with state regulations." Thus, in the present
contract, the regulation that the policy shall remain in effect until can-
celled by written notice barred cancellation of the policy by any other
means.
Transamerica argued that the statutory provisions only applied to situ-
ations where one party wanted to cancel a contract before coverage
ended and not to situations where a policy expired pursuant to its own
terms. 9 The court, however, dismissed these contentions, arguing that
the statutory language made no such distinction, and that prior interpre-
tations still applied.20 Therefore, only written notice could cancel
Transamerica's policy as opposed to expiration by its' own terms.2'
Co., 30 CaL 3d. 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981) (revealing the effects of
insurance required by law). See generally Steven L Paine & Wynn Heather Sourial, Re-
cent Developments in California Insurance Law: Enforceability of Stipulated
Judgments Against Insurance Carriers, 22 PEPP. L REV. 1017 (1995) (discussing trends
in California insurance law as to stipulated judgments); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 357 (1993
& Supp. 1996) (espousing important considerations of insurance law).
16. Thsnsamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 400-01, 906 P.2d at 1347, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
The relevant provisions being that the policy shall remain in effect until cancelled by
written notice to the PUC. Id. at 400, 906 P.2d at 1348, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
17. Id. at 399-400, 906 P.2d at 134647, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64. The conflict in the
present case was that the policy would expire one year after being purchased regard-
less of notification of cancellation. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 400-01, 906 P.2d at 1347, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 165. This was a distinction
drawn by the court of appeal in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Vincent, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 534, 541, 56 Cal. Rptr. 775, 780 (1967), where the court stated that "[i]n the
ordinary sense of the terms, there is a difference between cancellation of a policy and
its lapse by reason of the expiration of the term for which written"; see also 37 CAL
JuR. 3D Highway Freight Transport § 26 (1977 & Supp. 1996) (explaining the require-
ment of cancellation); 13 AM. Jun. 2D Carriers § 102 (1964 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the requirement of cancellation).
20. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 400-01, 906 P.2d at 1347, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-
65.
21. Id. at 401, 906 P.2d at 1347, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165. Consequently, Transamerica
had to pay part of the settlement resulting from Tab's accident with the Amtrak train.
Id.
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b. Insurance policies provided to highway carriers which are not
cancelled properly remain in effect despite the carrier being
protected by alternate insurance.
The court also addressed the argument that an insurer's non-compli-
ance with state regulations only exposes the insurer to continued liability
if the carrier does not have other insurance.' Justice Kennard cited an
analogous situation in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co.' where the court of appeal held that the cancellation require-
ment applied regardless of whether the insured bought replacement in-
surance.' The court agreed with the holding in Firemans' Fund, argu-
ing that the interpretation was most consistent with the regulatory
scheme.' Thus, Tab's purchase of alternate insurance did not relieve
Transamerica of liability for failing to comply with the proper cancella-
tion procedures.'
2. Insurance providers are entitled to reimbursements for any liability
arising from accidents occurring with the highway carrier after the
policy would have expired under its own terms.
Within the endorsement agreement attached to the policy between
Transamerica and Tab was a provision stating that the insured agreed to
reimburse the insurer for any payments made that would not have been
made but for state regulations.27 Justice Kennard simply applied the
same principles as had been used for the other disputed provisions.'
22. Id. at 401-03, 906 P.2d at 1347-49, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-66. Transamerica con-
tended this argument because Tab had purchased two more policies since the date that
Transamerica's policy should have expired. Id.
23. 234 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 286 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1991).
24. 7ransamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 401-03, 906 P.2d at 1347-48, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
165-66. See 8 B.E. WrrMN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 907
(1988 & Supp. 1996) (explaining the extent of the state's regulatory powers with re-
spect to carriers); 11 CAL JuR. 3D Carriers § 15 (1974 & Supp. 1996) (discussing gen-
eral state regulation of carriers). See generally J. Byron McCormick, The Regulation of
Motor Transportation, 22 CAL L REV. 24 (1933) (analyzing state regulation of motor
transportation).
25. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 401-03, 906 P.2d at 1347-48, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
165-66.
26. Id. at 402-03, 906 P.2d at 1348, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
27. Id. at 403, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166. See generally Douglas R.
Richmond, Issues and Problems In 'Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Se-ln-
surance, 22 PEPP. L REV. 1373 (1995) (exploring insurance contracts).
28. Transamerica, 12 Cal. 4th at 403-04, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
She explained that like the cancellation requirement, the reimbursement
requirement was a part of state regulations, and therefore, the insurance
contract incorporated the statutory reimbursement requirement.? As a
result, the court required Tab to reimburse Transamerica for all pay-
ments made after the time the policy would have ended but for the re-
quirement that the coverage shall last until cancelled.'
B. Justice Arabian's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Arabian stated that the majority's holding unjustly placed too
much of a burden on the insurer for slight clerical oversights." He ar-
gued that if the carrier has other insurance then this insurance protects
the public.' Thus, the court should relieve the insurer of liability when
it fails to comply with cancellation procedures.' Justice Arabian con-
cluded by stating that the majority's interpretation of the statute placed
form over substance and caused an unjust result.'
C. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Baxter agreed with the court of appeal, in that the statute in
question only referred to how a policy could be cancelled and did not
also pertain to the expiration of a policy on its own terms.' Conse-
quently, when Transamerica's policy expired with Tab, so too did
Transamerica's liability.' He also noted that because the statutory pro-
visions only refer to cancellation, the policy's referral to the expiration of
the coverage in the contract did not give rise to conflicting terms which
would nullify the policy's provisions.37 Lastly, Justice Baxter refrained
from addressing the issue of reimbursement because under his analysis
the issue would never arise. 8
29. Id.
30. Id. at 404, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167. The court noted that the
right of reimbursement would be of little effect if the previously insured became in-
solvent, but in light of the purposes of the statutes to protect the public, the court
held that the insurer should bear the risk of loss. Id.
31. Id. at 404-05, 906 P.2d at 1349-50, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-68 (Arabian, J., dis-
senting).
32. Id. at 405, 906 P.2d at 1350, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-68 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 405, 906 P.2d at 1350, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 407-10, 906 P.2d at 1351-53, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-71 (Baxter, J., dissent-
ing). The majority of Justice Baxter's dissent incorporates the opinion of the court of
appeal. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 410, 906 P.2d at 1353, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 412-13, 906 P.2d at 1354-55, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-73 (Baxter, J., dissent-
ing).
38. Id. at 408, 906 P.2d at 1351-52, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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1i9. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The court's holding in Transamerica firmly establishes that insurers
must comply with the statutory requirements for cancellation of policies
with highway carriers or else face liability for accidents that occur years
later.' The court will not relieve liability for non-compliance whether or
not the insured has obtained replacement insurance or if the contract
expires by its own terms.0 However, despite these strict requirements,
the insurer will have the right to reimbursement by the insured for any
payments made that would not have been made but for state regula-
tions.41
While the court's reading of the applicable statutes and regulations is
strict, it does ensure that a member of the public injured by a reckless
highway carrier will have recourse. Although the insurance companies
bear the risk that there might not be reimbursement, the court's holding
nonetheless seems equitable in that it protects the public welfare. 2
WILLIAM ANTHoNY BAIRD
39. See id. at 400-01, 906 P.2d at 1347, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-65.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 403-04, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
42. Id. at 404, 906 P.2d at 1349, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
VIII. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section
340.6(a)(1), the determination of when a plaintiff has
suffered "actual injury" for the purpose of commencing
the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice cause of
action is generally a question of fact, unless the facts are
undisputed wherein the determination is a matter of
law: Adams v. Paul.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adams v. Paul,' the California Supreme Court considered at what
point in time a plaintiff has suffered "actual injury" as a result of legal
malpractice where the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice lawsuit
is tolled until the plaintiff has sustained "actual injury."2 In addressing
1. 11 Cal. 4th 583, 904 P.2d 1205, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1995). Justice Arabian de-
livered the plurality opinion, in which Justices Baxter and Werdegar concurred. Id. at
585-93, 904 P.2d at 1206-12, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595-601. Justice Kennard wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. Id. at 593-99, 904 P.2d at 1212-16, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-05
(Kennard, J., concurring). Chief Justice Lucas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Mosk and George concurred. Id. at 599-606, 904 P.2d at 1216-20, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 605-09 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 585-93, 904 P.2d at 1206-12, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595-601. In Adams, Kather-
ine Adams sought to file a wrongful death action against her former husband's estate
for the death of their child. Id. at 586, 904 P.2d at 1207, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596. Ad-
ams consulted attorney Aaron Paul on the matter, but Paul negligently provided erro-
neous advice regarding the time period within which Adams should file the wrongful
death action. Id. As a result of Paul's negligence, Adams alleged that she was forced
to settle and dismiss the wrongful death action. Id. This resulted in Adams receiving
less money than she would have if the defendants did not have the statute of limita-
tions defense. Id. at 587, 904 P.2d at 1207, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
Adams next sought to instigate a lgal malpractice action against her former attor-
ney, Aaron Paul, for damages in excess of $200,000. Id. At trial, Paul demurred on the
ground that Adams' action against him was barred by the statute of limitations under
California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6(a) because the suit against him had been
filed more than one year after Paul had given a declaration admitting that he gave
Adams incorrect advice. Id. at 587, 904 P.2d at 1207-08, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-97.
Section 340.6(a) states that the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action com-
mences only after the plaintiff has suffered "actual injury." Id. at 588 n.1, 904 P.2d at
1208 n.1, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597 n.1. The primary issue in the present case was there-
fore when the "actual injury" arose. Id. at 588, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
Sustaining Paul's demurrer, the trial court held that Adams' malpractice action was
untimely because Adams had suffered "actual injury" when the statute of limitations ex-
pired in her wrongful death action. Id. at 587, 904 P.2d at 1207-08, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
596-97.
Affirming the trial court's holding, but using a different rationale, the court of
appeal reasoned that Adams suffered "actual injury" when she was forced to oppose
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this issue, the court looked closely at the policy and history surrounding
the relevant sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure.3 Overrul-
ing the holding of the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court held
that the time when a plaintiff has suffered an "actual injury" that will
commence the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice cause of ac-
tion is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine, unless the
facts are undisputed wherein the determination is a matter of law.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, began the opinion by exam-
ining California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1).' Section
340.6(a)(1) defines the statutory period in which a legal malpractice
cause of action6 must be filed, and tolls7 the commencement of the stat-
Paul's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 587, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
597.
3. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 587-93, 904 P.2d at 1208-12, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-601.
4. Id. at 588, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
5. California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6(a)(1) provides:
An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for
actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be com-
menced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the
wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or
omission, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commence-
ment of legal action exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled
during the time that any of the following exist. (1) The plaintiff has not sus-
tained actual injury ....
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
6. See generally 6 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNLA LAW, Torts § 732 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1994) (describing the elements of a negligence cause of action); Martin
T. Fletcher, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 773 (1968) ("[Tihe
elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of medical or legal malpractice are
the same as those necessary to state a cause of action for ordinary, non-professional
negligence . . .).
7. See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 85 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (de-
scribing the tolling of the statute of limitations); 51 AM. Jtm. 2D Limitation of Actions
§ 107 (1970 & Supp. 1993) (explaining when the period of limitation is tolled).
ute of limitations8 period in such cases until "actual injury" has been
determined.'
Seeking to resolve whether the "actual injury" should be determined as
a question of fact or a matter of law, Justice Arabian examined the poli-
cy, 0 history," and precedent 2 associated with the statute, and ulti-
mately stated that while the issue of "actual injury" generally raises a
question of fact, 3 the court may resolve the issue of "actual injury"
when material facts are undisputed and the plaintiff suffered "manifest
and palpable injury" as a matter of law."'
8. See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 172 (1988 & Supp. 1996) (de-
scribing how the statute of limitations applies in legal malpractice); 51 AM. JUR. 2D
Limitation of Actions § 2 (1970 & Supp. 1993) (providing a general overview of the
statute of limitations); 43 CAL. JUR. 3D Limitation of Actions § 23 (1978 & Supp. 1996)
(describing the commencement of the statute of limitations); 7 CAL JuR. 3D Attorneys
at Law § 340 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (explaining how attorneys use the statute of limita-
tions as a defense); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Governs
Damage Action Against Attorney for Malpractice, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 284 (1980 & Supp.
1995) (discussing when the statute of limitations commences in malpractice lawsuits);
Laura C. Hart et al., From Offense to Defense: Defending Legal Malpractice Claims, 45
S. CAL L. REv. 771, 781-84 (1994) (discussing the use of the statute of limitations to
bar an attorney malpractice action).
9. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 588, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
10. The myriad of circumstances under which statute of limitations
issues may arise in missed statute cases sharply illustrates the prac-
ticality of applying the prevailing 'question-of-fact' rule to the de-
termination of when actual injury occurs. The number of potential
variables, which do not necessarily follow a set pattern, precludes
defining the point of harm as a fixed point or event because rea-
sonable application becomes too problematic (citations omitted).
The issue may be resolved 'as a matter of law' only if the facts are
undisputed.
Id. at 588-89, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
11. "[W]e find nothing in the language or history of section 340.6(a)(1) indicating the
Legislature intended, in codifying decisional law, to alter the well-settled principle that
in legal malpractice actions statute of limitations issues, including injury, are at base
factual inquiries." Id. at 588, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
12. Id.; see McCann v. Welden, 153 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 200 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708-09
(1984) (holding that because actionable harm may occur at any one of several points
in time subsequent to an attorney's negligence, the determination is generally a ques-
tion of fact); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 202, 491 P.2d 433, 438, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849,
854 (1971) (establishing the "actual injury" tolling provision from which California Code
of Civil Procedure § 340.6 is derived).
13. See generally 6 B.E. WrmaN, SUMMARY OF CAuroIRNL LAw, Torts § 749 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing examples of what constitutes a question of fact).
14. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 588-93, 904 P.2d at 1208-12, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-601.
See generally 7 A. Jun. 2D Attorneys at Law § 224 (1980 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the importance of distinguishing between questions of law and fact in attorney mal-
practice actions); 7 CAL JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 343 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (discuss-
ing questions of law and fact in attorney malpractice causes of action); 6 B.E. WrrIN,
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Justice Arabian next sought to explain how and when "actual injury"
arises as a result of attorney malpractice." To aid in. his explanation,
Justice Arabian broke "actual injury" into two categories. 6 The first
category deals with facts similar to the instant case, where the attorney
failed to file the client's claim or cause of action within the time required
by the statute of limitations. 7 In these "missed statute" cases, the gener-
al rule 8 states that the statute of limitations will begin at the time the
statutory period lapses. 9 Hence, in the instant case, Adams would argue
that the "actual injury" occurred when the statute of limitations expired
in her wrongful death action.' °
If the attorney is negligent in some manner other than missing the
statute of limitations, determining when "actual injury" occurs and the
statute of limitations commences for the attorney malpractice cause of
action is contingent upon a determination2' that the plaintiff suffered
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 967 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (explaining the
difference between questions of law and fact).
15. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 589-91, 904 P.2d at 1209-10, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
See generally 7 CAL JuR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 340 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (describing
certain acts that constitute attorney malpractice); 6 B.E. WrrGN, SUMMARY OF CALwOR-
NIA LAw, Torts § 859 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (describing relationships that give
rise to a duty); Steven H. Felderstein, Legal Malpractice-Is the Discovery Rule the
Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGS U. 795 (1973) (discussing reform in the area of legal
malpractice); Manuel R Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret,
47 VAND. L REV. 1657 (1994) (detailing the prevalence of legal malpractice); Lawyers'
Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L REV. 1547 (1994) (discussing
legal malpractice in relation to a lawyer's responsibilities).
16. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 589-91, 904 P.2d at 1209-10, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
17. Id. at 589-90, 904 P.2d at 1209-10, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
18. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. For example, supposing that an
attorney failed to commence an action for the client against a third party within the
time required by the applicable statute of limitations, determination of "actual injury
may require resolution of factual issues such as which limitation period applies to the
third party claim and whether the third party waived or would be estopped to assert a
defense based on expiration of the limitations period." Id. at 596, 904 P.2d at 1214, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (Kennard, J., concurring). See infra note 27.
19. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 589-91, 904 P.2d at 1209-10, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
"[T]he plaintiff suffers actual harm at the time the statutory period lapses because,
assuming the claim was otherwise viable, the right and/or remedy of recovery on the
action has been substantially impaired." Id. at 589, 904 P.2d at 1209, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 598.
20. Id. at 588, 904 P.2d at 1208, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. The supreme court re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with the present opinion. Id. at 593, 904 P.2d at
1212, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
21. In legal malpractice actions involving contingent or speculative harm, "the de-
"definite and certain injury' or more than nominal or insubstantial dam-
ages."'
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennard sought to expand on
the holding propounded by the majority. 4 First, Justice Kennard agreed
with the majority that the "actual injury" determination is generally a
question of fact in legal malpractice cases.25 Next, seeking to clarify the
term "actual injury," Justice Kennard noted the significance of Budd v.
Nixen,26 which provides the analytical framework for making the "actual
injury" determination in all attorney malpractice cases.' Lastly, Justice
Kennard discussed the profound significance that the expiration of the
statute of limitations can have on a third party claim.'
C. Justice Lucas' Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Lucas criticized the majority for refusing to
make an express determination as to when the plaintiff in a legal mal-
practice action has suffered "actual injury. 29 As a result of the
majority's nonconclusive determination, Justice Lucas argued that the
trier of fact in future attorney malpractice cases will have no criteria by
which to determine when "actual injury" occurred.' For these reasons,
termination of actual injury does not necessarily depend upon or require some form of
final adjudication, as by judgment or settlement." Id. at 591, 904 P.2d at 1210, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 599. See generally 40 CAL JuR. 3D Judgments § 1 (1995) (describing the
fundamental principles of judgments).
22. "[T]he fact of damage rather than the amount is the relevant consideration." Ad-
ams, 11 Cal. 4th at 589, 904 P.2d at 1209, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
23. Id. at 590-91, 904 P.2d at 1210, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599. See generally Ronald E.
Mallen, Limitations and the Need for "Damages" in Legal Malpractice Actions, 60 DEF.
CouNs. J. 234 (1993) (explaining how actual damage must arise before the statute of
limitations commences in legal malpractice actions).
24. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 594, 904 P.2d at 1212, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
25. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
26. 6 Cal. 3d 195, 202, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); see supra note 12.
27. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 594-96, 904 P.2d at 1213-14, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602-03
(Kennard, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 596-99, 904 P.2d at 1214-16, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603-05 (Kennard, J., con-
curring). The third party refers to the defendant whom the plaintiff originally sought to
sue, but was unable to sue because of attorney malpractice committed either by failing
to commence an action for the client against the third party within the time required
by the applicable statute of limitations, or by misadvising the client about that require-
ment. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring); see supra note 18.
29. Adams, 11 Cal. 4th at 599-600, 904 P.2d at 1216, 46 Cal. Rptr, 2d at 605 (Lucas,
C.J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 602-03, 904 P.2d at 1218-19, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607-08 (Lucas, C.J., dis-
[Vol. 24: 725, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Justice Lucas would have held that where an attorney is using a statute
of limitations defense to avoid being sued for legal malpractice, the
plaintiffs "actual injury" occurs "at the time of disposition of the client's
underlying lawsuit, whether by dismissal, settlement or entry of adverse
judgment."3
III. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
Rather than defining "actual injury" by expressly determined criteria,
the majority in Adams held that the determination of when a plaintiff has
suffered actual damages in a legal malpractice claim for the purpose of
commencing the statute of limitations is generally a question of fact.32
Adams therefore promotes judicial economy by resolving prior conflict-
ing decisions within the trial and appellate courts. More importantly,
Adams' clarification of the current state of the law is essential to future
malpractice litigation, particularly as the incidence of attorney malprac-
tice claims continues to rise at unprecedented levels.
ROGER H. SHAAR, JR.
* senting).
31. Id. at 605, 904 P.2d at 1220, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 593, 904 P.2d at 1212, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
IX. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Landlords and hotel proprietors may not be held strictly
liable for injuries to their tenants or guests caused by de-
fects in the premises: Peterson v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Peterson v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a hotel guest who is injured on the premises may sue the
hotel proprietor in strict products liability for an alleged defect in the
premises.2 The court held that strict liability was not an appropriate
standard because the proprietor of a hotel is "not a part of the manu-
facturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective product."3 In
so holding, the supreme court overruled its previous decision in Becker
v. IRM Corp., in which it held that strict liability was an appropriate
standard in a products liability claim against a residential landlord.5 The
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995). Justice George wrote
the unanimous opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Kennard, Ara-
bian, Baxter, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1188, 1210, 899 P.2d at 906, 921, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 837, 852.
2. Id. at 1188, 899 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837. The plaintiff, Nadine Pe-
terson, brought an action against the owners and the operator of the Palm Springs
Marquis Hotel after she sustained serious injuries on the premises. The plaintiff alleged
that she sustained these injuries when she slipped and fell in the bathtub while taking
a shower at the hotel. Id. She alleged that the bathtub was defective because it was
very slippery and did not contain any "'safety measures' such as 'anti-slid surfaces,
grab rails, rubber mats, or the like.'" Id. The manufacturer of the bathtub, who was
also a named defendant in the action, settled with the plaintiff. Id.
Before trial, the owners of the hotel and the operator of the hotel moved to pre-
clude the use of the strict liability theory during the case. Id. at 1189, 889 P.2d at 906-
07, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-38. The court granted the motion. Id. The case went to
trial, but was declared a mistrial for an unrelated reason. Id. at 1190, 899 P.2d at 907,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838. The trial court confirmed that the strict liability cause of ac-
tion would not be allowed in the retrial. Id. The court of appeal denied the plaintiffs
subsequent petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition. Id. The plaintiff then peti-
tioned the California Supreme Court, which ordered the court of appeal to grant the
writ. Id. The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate forcing the trial court to allow
the strict liability cause of action in the retrial. Id. The defendants then sought review
in the California Supreme Court. Id.
3. Id. at 1188, 899 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.
4. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), overruled by Peterson,
10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836.
5. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. In Becker, the
plaintiff alleged that he was injured by the shower door in his apartment Id. at 457,
698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The plaintiff alleged that the door was a defect
in the premises because it was made of untempered glass and he sued his landlord.
Id. The court ruled that "a landlord engaged in the business of leased dwellings is
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court determined that its decision in Becker represented an unwarranted
extension of the doctrine of "products liability" and reversed the court of
appeal's decision to the extent that it permitted the plaintiff to proceed
on a strict liability theory.'
II. TREATMENT
The supreme court in Peterson began by re-examining its decision in
Becker v. IRM Corp.7 In Becker, the court had ruled that a landlord
makes an "implied assurance of safety"' when he rents his premises, and
therefore, he is strictly liable for any damages arising out of a latent
defect in the premises that existed on the day the premises were leased.9
The Peterson court next discussed the fundamental principles of strict
liability. ° First, the court stated that it is a well established principle
that retailers could be held strictly liable in a products liability case be-
cause, like manufacturers, they are in the business of distributing goods
to the public at large." Second, the court noted that the retailer is also
in a position to pressure the manufacturer to make safe products. 2 In
addition, the costs of production can be allocated equally between the
retailer and the manufacturer to spread any added safety cost. 3 Justice
George noted however that, by analogizing a landlord to a retailer, the
Becker court failed to recognize the fact that many of the policy argu-
ments which justify a strict liability standard to be imposed upon a retail-
strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premises when
the defect existed at the time the premises were leased to the tenant." Id. at 464, 698
P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
6. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1210, 899 P.2d at 921, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
7. Id. at 1190-95, 899 P.2d at 907-10, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838-41.
8. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
9. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
10. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1188-1210, 899 P.2d at 906-21, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-52.
11. Id. at 1198, 899 P.2d at 912-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843-44. See generally 50 CAL
JUR. 3D Products Liability § 30 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (providing information on strict
liability in products liability cases); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Foreword, Sym-
posium on the American Law Institutes' Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility
for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 213 (1993) (discussing products liability
reform); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L REV. 479 (1990)
(tracking judicial changes in products liability); Theodore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L REV.
731 (1992) (analyzing the recent changes in products liability law).
12. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1198, 899 P.2d at 912-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843-44.
13. Id.
er do not apply to cases involving landlords or hotel proprietors. 4 For
instance, a landlord usually cannot pressure a manufacturer to make safe
products, and hotel proprietors would have to pay almost all the cost of
insuring a completely safe room because, unlike retailers, they cannot
charge a higher rate for safety. 5
In addition, the supreme court noted that the implied warranty of hab-
itability does not stretch so far as to impose strict liability for injuries to
a tenant because it would place "an undue burden on the landlord, re-
gardless of fault or ability to avoid injury." ' Instead, the purpose of the
implied warranty of habitability is to prevent inaction by landlords when
they are aware of a problem and to encourage landlords to take reason-
able steps to discover problems, not to fix problems of which they could
not possibly be aware."
The supreme court noted that strict liability might apply to landlords
and hotel proprietors where the landlord or hotel proprietor participated
in the construction of the premises or product."8 In Peterson, however,
there were no facts alleged which would prove that the hotel proprietor
participated in the construction of the hotel or the bathtub. 9 Therefore,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision to the extent
that it directed the superior court to apply the standard of strict liability,
and affirmed the decision as to all other respects.'
Ill. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
After the decision in Becker, courts were forced to apply the strict
liability standard to product liability claims involving a landlord or a
hotel proprietor when there was injury to a tenant or guest.2' The ad-
verse reaction to this decision caused the California Supreme Court to
re-examine its decision, and in Peterson, the supreme court held that a
14. Id. at 1198-99, 899 P.2d at 913, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
15. Id. at 1199, 899 P.2d at 913, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
16. Id. at 1204, 899 P.2d at 916-17, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48.
17. Id.
18. Id, at 1200, 899 P.2d at 913-14, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-45. See generally 6 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Torts § 1290 (9th ed. 1988) (reviewing the gen-
eral rules regarding which types of plaintiffs and defendants are subject to strict lia-
bility).
19. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1200 & n.9, 899 P.2d at 914 & n.9, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
845 & n.9.
20. Id. at 1210, 899 P.2d at 921, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
21. See 4 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Real Property § 610 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing recent applications of the Becker holding); Emily M.
Haliday, Comment, California's Approach to Landlord Liability for Tenant Injuries:
Strict Liability Reexamined, 26 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 367 (1993) (discussing burdens the
Becker case places on landlords).
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negligence standard, rather that a strict liability standard is the appro-
priate standard in such circumstances.' Hence, parties that are not
within the manufacturing or marketing enterprise of a product may no
longer be held strictly liable for damages caused by defects in the prod-
uct.' However, landlords or hotel proprietors that participate in the
construction of the premises or product are deemed to be part of the en-
terprise and can be held strictly liable.'
MARC S. HANISH
22. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1188-89, 899 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
23. See Douglas H. Cook, Negligence or Strict Liability? A Study in Biblical Tort
Law, 13 WHrrrIER L REV. 1 (1992) (examining the differences between the negligence
and strict liability standards); see also 42 CAL JU. 3D Landlord and Tenant § 98
(1978 & Supp. 1996) (listing other landlord responsibilities).
24. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1200, 899 P.2d at 913-14, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-45.
SUMMARIES
I. Community Property
When an employee spouse continues to work after the date
upon which retirement benefits become due and the
nonemployee spouse chooses immediate payment of their
share of the benefits, the nonemployee spouse is entitled to
obtain payments from the date on which he or she files a
motion seeking immediate payment.
In re Marriage of Cartos, Supreme Court of California, decided
May 30, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 381, 916 P.2d 476, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
81.
Facts. In 1978, after twenty-one years of marriage, Carlos and Lois
Cornejo were divorced. Carlos worked for the San Francisco Unified
School District and belonged to the State Teachers' Retirement System.
On May 16, 1989, he was sixty years old and eligible for retirement. How-
ever, Carlos continued to work, forestalling his retirement benefit pay-
ments to which Lois was entitled to a portion thereof. On August 3, 1992,
Lois wrote a letter to Carlos stating her intent to file a motion to amend
the final judgment of their divorce to account for her community proper-
ty interest in his retirement benefits. On March 31, 1993, Lois filed the
motion and sought immediate payments of benefits due to her retroac-
tive to May 16, 1989. On October 14, 1996, the trial court modified the
final judgment to reflect Lois' share of the retirement benefits and or-
dered payments to be made retroactive to May 16, 1989. Carlos appealed
the portion of the judgment directing the retroactive payments. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's holding.
Holding. Reversing the appellate court on the issue of when a
nonemployee spouse is entitled to receive payments from a working
former spouse's retirement plan, the supreme court held that payments
begin from the date of filing of a motion for such payment, not from the
date of the employee spouse's eligibility to retire. The court stated that
choosing the filing date provided a bright line for courts to follow, clear-
ly communicated the nonemployee spouse's choice to commence pay-
ments, and made clear to the employee spouse that payments could be
avoided by retiring.
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II. Criminal Law
A. Statute authorizing serious felony enhancement
for prior conviction of burglary of "inhabited
dwelling house" encompassed burglary of inhab-
ited vessel at time of enactment of statute.
People v. Cruz, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed August 5, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 764, 919 P.2d 731,
55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117.
Facts. The defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree rob-
bery and one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. In a sec-
ond proceeding, the jury found that the defendant had been convicted of
a prior first degree burglary. At a third proceeding, the jury convicted the
defendant for one count of escape. At the final proceeding, the court
revoked the defendant's probation for the first burglary. The defendant
received a twelve-year, eight month sentence which included a five-year
enhancement for the prior first degree burglary. On appeal, the defendant
argued that under the California Penal Code, his prior conviction should
not have been considered a "prior serious felony." The defendant rea-
soned that because it could have been a burglary of a vessel it did not
qualify under the Code.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
phrase "inhabited dwelling house" as used in California Penal Code sec-
tion 1192.7(c)(18) is to be broadly construed and includes inhabited ves-
sels. While section 460 (which divides burglary into degrees) specifically
addresses inhabited vessels, its absence in section 1192.7(c)(18) does not
make its definition of burglary as a serious felony less inclusive. The
court stated that legislative history demonstrates the intent that section
1192.7(c)(18) conform with the definition of first degree burglary in sec-
tion 460. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the danger of violence in
an inhabited vessel is the same as that in a home or any other living
quarters. Thus, burglary of an inhabited vessel should likewise be treated
as a serious felony.
B. Because the defendant's initial display of a fire-
arm contributed to the completion of an essen-
tial element of subsequent sex crimes, the de-
fendant used the firearm within the meaning of
Penal Code section 12022.3(a), which provides
for sentence enhancements when the person
uses a firearm or other deadly weapon in the
commission of the crime.
People v. Masbruch, Supreme Court of California,
decided August 26, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1001, 920 P.2d
705, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760.
Facts. The defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, burglary, two
counts of residential robbery, two counts of false imprisonment, and two
counts of torture for which the defendant received a sentence which in-
cluded two four-year enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3(a).
Section 12022.3(a) provides for sentence enhancements for the "use" of a
firearm in the commission of a crime. Although the defendant conceded
that such enhancements were appropriate for the theft offenses, the
defendant challenged the application of the enhancements pertaining to
the multiple sex offenses on the basis that the initial display of the fire-
arm prior to the commission of the sex crimes did not constitute a use
of the firearm within the statutory meaning.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the defendant's initial display of the firearm constituted a
use of the firearm within the meaning set forth in section 12022.3(a) be-
cause the display of the firearm aided in the completion of an essential
element of the sex crimes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the imposition
of section 12022.3(a) enhancements for those crimes. Furthermore, the
court stated that its conclusion furthered the legislative intent of section
12022.3(a)'s enhancements which is to deter the use of firearms in the
commission of violent crimes.
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C. California Penal Code section 969a allows the
prosecution to amend a "pending indictment or
information" to allege prior convictions after
the defendant has been convicted but before he
has been sentenced.
People v. Valladoli, Supreme Court of California,
decided July 18, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 590, 918 P.2d
999, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695.
Facts. The defendant was charged with one count of sale of heroin and
cocaine. The original complaint contained ten enhancement allegations
which were mistakenly crossed out due to a clerical error. After the
defendant had been found guilty at trial, the prosecution made a motion
to amend the information to allege the prior felony convictions. The
defense council objected arguing that information could not be amended
after the verdict had been rendered because the information was no
longer "pending" as required by California Penal Code section 969a,
which governs amendments of prior convictions. The trial court allowed
the information to be amended. The jury found the defendant had three
prior felony convictions and added an additional seven years to his five
year sentence. The court of appeal affirmed.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the language "pending information or indictment" allows
the prosecution to amend after the verdict but before sentencing. The su-
preme court noted that the language employed by California Penal Code
section 969a is similar to Penal Code section 969 which governs
amendments for prior convictions in the cases where the defendant
pleads guilty. The supreme court found these to be parallel statutes be-
cause a guilty plea and a guilty verdict are tantamount for most purpos-
es. The court recognized that because these provisions are parallel stat-
utes they must be construed together. The court therefore concluded
that the intent of the legislature was to allow informations and indict-
ments to be amended up until sentencing.
11. Eminent Domain
Under the Eminent Domain Law of California, a provision
of a lease which provides for termination in the event of
acquisition for public use does not prevent the lessee
from receiving compensation for the taking of his lease-
hold or other property.
Vista v. Fielder, Supreme Court of California, decided July
25, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 612, 919 P.2d 151, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861.
Facts. The City of Vista, as the plaintiff, brought suit to condemn the
property of the defendants in order to broaden and realign the adjoining
street. The Johnsons owned the property in fee simple absolute and
executed a lease to defendant Todo, Inc. doing business as Bittners Res-
taurant Equipment. Clause 5 of the lease provided that upon condemna-
tion of the property through no fault of the lessee, the lease would termi-
nate. The lessee sued the City of Vista for damages to the "goodwill" of
their business. The superior court granted the city's motion for summary
judgment, and the court of appeal reversed and remanded. On remand,
the superior court made essentially the same determination after a bench
trial, holding that Clause 5 operated to deprive the lessee of any right to
compensation. The court of appeal affirmed, basing its decision on the
"majority rule under the general common law that a provision of a lease
that declares that the lease terminates.., deprives the lessee of any
right he may have to compensation. .... "
Holding. The Supreme Court of California reversed the decision of the
court of appeal. The Court stated that the Eminent Domain Law, title 7
of part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, commencing with section
1230.010, generally entitles a lessee to "compensation for the value of his
leasehold interest ... and any of his property taken... including good-
will." In addition, the Eminent Domain Law provides that "termination of
a lease ... does not preclude a lessee's recovery of compensation."
Therefore, the court of appeal erred in its determination of the effect of
Clause 5. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court stated that the
court of appeal did not have the authority to apply the "majority rule
under the general common law" because the rule provided by the Emi-
nent Domain Law is directly contrary. Therefore, the California Supreme
Court held that under the Eminent Domain Law of California, a provision
of a lease which provides for termination in the event of acquisition for
public use does not prevent the lessee from receiving compensation for
"the taking of his leasehold or other property."
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IV. Hearsay
When proving convictions of "prior serious felonies,"
excerpts from a preliminary hearing transcript are admis-
sible under the former testimony hearsay exception be-
cause although the witnesses may be actually available to
testify, they are "unavailable" under controlling case law;
however, statements from a probation report that fail to
fit under any hearsay exception are inadmissible.
People v. Reed, Supreme Court of California, decided April 25,
1996, 13 Cal. 4th 217, 914 P.2d 184, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106.
Facts. The defendant was charged and convicted of second degree rob-
bery. In order to increase the defendant's sentence under California Pe-
nal Code, section 667(a), which allows a five-year increase in sentences
for each prior serious felony, the prosecution presented evidence of the
defendant's prior serious felonies in the form of two documents, a pre-
liminary hearing transcript and a probation report excerpt. The trial
court admitted the evidence, found a prior serious felony, and imposed a
five-year sentence enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed the sen-
tence enhancement, finding that the preliminary transcript fell within a
statutory exception to the hearsay ban and that admission of the proba-
tion report was harmless error.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that the preliminary transcript fell within the former
testimony hearsay exception because: (1) the preliminary transcript was
part of the record of the prior conviction, which the trier of fact is limit-
ed to in formulating the substance of the prior conviction by People v.
Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 748 P.2d 1150, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1988); (2) the
preliminary transcript itself was within the official records exception to
the hearsay prohibition; and (3) the statements made by the victims fell
within the former testimony exception to the hearsay ban because al-
though they were technically available to testify in the instant proceed-
ing, they were barred from testifying as to the prior convictions under
Guerrero.
The court further held that the portions of the probation report were
inadmissible hearsay, as they did not fit within any of the hearsay ex-
ceptions. Nevertheless, the supreme court agreed with the appellate
court that admission of the probation report excerpts at the trial court
level was merely duplicative of the preliminary transcript evidence, and
thus the error was harmless.
V. Lotteries
The California State Lottery may not operate the game
Keno because it does not meet the statutory definition of
a "lottery game" or that of a "lottery" in accordance with
the California State Lottery Act.
Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, Supreme
Court of California, decided June 24, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 475,
917P.2d 651, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812.
Facts. After the California State Lottery began operating the game Keno,
Western Telcon and the California Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective
Association brought an action against the California State Lottery (CSL),
seeking a declaration that Keno is illegal, as well as an injunction against
its further operation. In Keno, participants attempt to match between one
and ten numbers to a set of twenty numbers randomly selected, in ex-
change for a payoff. The trial court granted CSL's summary judgment
motion, permitted the California-Nevada Indian Gaming Association
(CNIGA) to intervene as a defendant, and entered judgment for the de-
fendants CSL and CNIGA. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that CSL
Keno "fully complied" with the provisions of the initiative measure autho-
rizing the state lottery. The California Supreme Court granted the
plaintiffs' and CSL's petitions for review.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that CSL Keno is not an authorized lottery game. The court
referred to the California State Lottery Act, which allows CSL to conduct
only lotteries. The court reasoned that CSL may not run any game that
does not meet the statutory definition of a "lottery game" or a "lottery."
The court stated that a lottery is a prize which is distributed by chance
and has been paid for with consideration. In a lottery, the prize will al-
ways be distributed, and thus, a lottery operator does not have a stake in
the outcome of the draw.
The court stated that CSL Keno was clearly a house banking game,
where there is a wager between two parties which may be won by either
party. The court reasoned that in the game of Keno, each player places a
wager on the outcome of the draw of random numbers, and either the
player will win, or CSL will keep the wager. Because the payoffs are de-
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termined by the draw, the Keno operator has a stake in the outcome.
Thus, the court held that CSL Keno was not a lottery, and CSL is not
authorized to conduct the game.
VI. Public Aid and Welfare
A- California Welfare and Institutions Code section
14170(a)(1) requires the Department of Health
Services to challenge the truth or accuracy of
providers' cost reports within three years, but
does not establish a time limitation governing
the final determination of the reimbursement
amount due providers.
Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center v. Belshe, Su-
preme Court of California, decided August 1, 1996,
13 Cal. 4th 748, 919 P.2d 721, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107.
Facts. The plaintiff, Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center, is a health ser-
vices provider under the Medi-Cal program, the state's implementation of
the national Medicaid program. The plaintiff sought a writ to rescind the
Department of Health Services' final settlement determination of the
amount due to the plaintiff for Medi-Cal reimbursement because notice
of the determination was issued more than three years after the plaintiff
submitted its cost reports. The Welfare and Institutions Code section
14170(a)(1) provides that cost reports "shall be considered true and cor-
rect unless audited or reviewed within three years" of submission. The
plaintiff argued that this creates a three year period in which the depart-
ment must determine the final amount of reimbursement based on the
cost reports, i.e., the three year requirement applies to the entire reim-
bursement procedure. The Department argued that the three year limita-
tion only forecloses the opportunity to challenge the veracity and accura-
cy of the cost reports. The dispute arose after the Department concluded
that interim payments to the plaintiff during the determination of the
final settlement had exceeded the amount of the final settlement and the
Department sought to recoup those payments. The plaintiffs administra-
tive hearing before the Department contesting the overpayment determi-
nation yielded the conclusion that the three year limit only applies to the
determination of the accuracy of the reports, not the entire process. The
plaintiff then filed a writ to rescind the ruling based on section
14170(a)(1) and Civil Procedure Code section 338, which establishes a
time limitation on liabilities created by statute. The trial court rejected
the plaintiffs petition but was reversed by the court of appeal.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal and resolving a conflict between
two divisions of the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
three year limitation is only applicable to the determination of the truth
and accuracy of the cost reports and not to the entire reimbursement
procedure. The court reached this conclusion for several reasons: first,
the court interpreted the legislative intent through a "plain meaning"
examination of the statute, emphasizing that the statutory provision in
question only addresses truth and accuracy and not final settlements;
second, the time limit existed prior to the state's implementation of a
more restrictive reimbursement standard that necessarily resulted in
delay, so applying the three year limit to the entire process would frus-
trate the legislature's intent to implement the new process; third, the
existence of separate appellate processes for grievances arising from
audits and from final settlements indicates the legislature's intent that
they be examined separately; lastly, the Department has consistently in-
terpreted the time limit as governing solely the audit process, and the
legislature has impliedly endorsed this practice by continually amending
and reenacting the statutory provision containing the time limitation
without altering the language to indicate that the limitation applies to the
entire reimbursement process. The supreme court therefore reversed the
court of appeal, but remanded because the court of appeal never ad-
dressed the plaintiffs challenge to the final settlement under Civil Proce-
dure Code section 338.
B. Under rule 1466(b) of the California Rules of
Court, a juvenile court judge is not limited to
making a determination of a change of circum-
stances only if a "sua sponte" condition exists.
Additionally, a juvenile court judge is not barred
from making a determination of a change of
circumstances if a party makes a request to the
court without filing a petition for modification
on the ground of changed circumstances.
San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Supe-
rior Court, Supreme Court of California, decided August
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8, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 882, 919 P.2d 1329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
396.
Facts. Upon petition by the San Diego County Department of Social
Services (Department) in July 1992, the juvenile court declared that two
children were within their jurisdiction due to sexual abuse. The court
removed the children from their parents' home, placed them in foster
care, and began family reunification services. In January 1995, after both
parents made few attempts to contact their children, the court discontin-
ued the reunification services and ordered long-term foster care as a
permanent plan. In June 1995, after both parents still had made few ef-
forts to contact their children, the Department found the children a pro-
spective adoptive parent. In July 1995, the mother, her legal counsel, and
the father's legal counsel made an appearance at the six-month status
review. During the status review, the Department requested the court to
schedule a hearing on adoption as the new permanent plan. The court,
believing circumstances had changed due to the presence of the parents,
conditioned the scheduling of a hearing on the Department's submittal of
a petition for modification on the ground of changed circumstances. The
court of appeal issued a writ of mandate ordering the juvenile court to
vacate its order conditioning the hearing on the submission of a petition
for modification.
Holding. Affirming the court of appeal, the supreme court disaffirmed In
re Nina P., 26 Cal. App. 4th 615, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (1994), and held
rule 1466(b) of the California Rules of Court does not limit a juvenile
court judge from making a determination of a change of circumstances
only in the presence of a sua sponte condition. The court also held that a
juvenile court judge may make a determination of changed circumstances
based on a request by a party without a petition for modification being
filed. Further, the court held that neither act threatens due process rights
because the petition is determined on the basis of "a change of circum-
stances at the threshold and entails a subsequent noticed hearing on the
merits."
VII. Schools
California Education Code, section 44929.21(b), provid-
ing the reelection procedures for probationary teachers
which a school district must follow, preempts any con-
flicting procedural protections to be set forth in a col-
lective bargaining agreement.
Board of Education of the Round Valley Unified School Dis-
trict v. Round Valley Teachers Ass'n, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, decided April 29, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 269, 914 P.2d 193,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115.
Facts. The School District (District) and the Teachers Association (As-
sociation) entered into a collective bargaining agreement, as permitted by
California Government Code, sections 3540 through 3549.3. The
agreement stated that any decision by the District not to reelect a pro-
bationary teacher for the following school year must satisfy two re-
quirements: (1) a thirty-day notice requirement, and (2) specific reasons
must be provided for the decision not to reelect the teacher. Pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement, just cause was required for a deci-
sion not to reelect probationary teachers.
The District's superintendent notified a probationary teacher that his
contract would not be renewed without providing the teacher with spe-
cific reasons. Defendant Association filed a grievance alleging that the
District had violated the reelection procedures under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Upon an arbitrator's finding that the District must
comply with the procedures set forth in the agreement, the District
sought to vacate the arbitration order by arguing that the agreement was
preempted by California Education Code, section 44929.21(b), which
allows for non reelection decisions without a hearing or statement of
reasons. The District further alleged that section 44929.21(b) exclusively
governed reelection procedures of probationary teachers. The trial court
held the arbitrator exceeded its power by allowing the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement to supersede the California Education
Code. The District requested the court of appeal to overturn the vacation
of the arbitrator's award on the grounds that the procedural protections
set forth in the agreement did not conflict with California Education
Code, section 44929.21(b).
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that California Education Code, section 44929.21(b), preempts
collective bargaining agreements from addressing reelection procedures
of probationary teachers. Looking to the legislative intent of the statute,
the court stated that where the legislature vests exclusive discretion in
the District to determine whether to reelect a probationary teacher, such
decisions may not be the subject of collective bargaining. The court fur-
ther stated that the legislatures' findings that the state's interest in dis-
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charging unsuitable teachers outweighs due process considerations of
teachers must be validated by the courts. Since the legislature deemed
that a reelection decision may be made without cause, the supreme court
concluded that any agreement to the contrary is in direct conflict with
the statute, and is therefore preempted.
The court further held that an arbitrator's award enforcing specific
procedural provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be sub-
ject to judicial review in limited circumstances. The court noted that
strong public policy favors deference to arbitrator decisions. The court
concluded, however, that an arbitrator's decision which is inconsistent
with a party's statutory rights is an exceptional circumstance that justi-
fies judicial review.
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